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339 
OFF TO ELBA!1  THE LEGITIMACY OF SEX OFFENDER 
RESIDENCE AND EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS 
Joseph L. Lester* 
There are times when politicians are hostages to the lusts of their 
constituents.  They dare not oppose bills that, if defeated, would serve 
only to aggravate those who placed them into office.2  Regardless of 
whether they actually favor the measures, the political risk is too great 
not to allow their constituents’ passions to overrun their own common 
sense.  As a consequence, laws are passed with little or no resistance.3  
These laws can fundamentally alter the liberties and freedom of a few to 
satisfy the ignorant fear of the masses.  As a result, laws that in theory 
appear to protect society, in practice only exacerbate the perceived 
problem.  In situations like this, an independent judiciary must do what 
needs to be done.  Because sometimes the desire of the majority 
overbears individual liberty, it is critical that the courts protect the 
 
* Joseph L. Lester is a Professor of Law at Faulkner University, Thomas Goode Jones School of 
Law, in Montgomery, Alabama.  The author would like to thank John Craft (J.D. candidate, 2007) 
for his excellent and tireless research for this article. 
 1. Elba is the island Napoleon was exiled to until his attempt to retake the French Crown 
after which he was sent to St. Helena to live in exile the remaining six years of his life. 
 2. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
529-530 (2001). 
 3. See e.g., Georgia General Assembly Homepage, 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2005_06/sum/hb1059.htm (last visited March 4, 2007) (showing that 
H.B. 1059, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/versions/hb1059_HB_1059_AP_11.htm, which radically 
limited the areas in which a sex offender could live and work passed the State Senate 52 to 1); 
Activist Judges Last Hope of Democratic Party, Georgia Republican Party, (July 10, 2006), 
http://www.gagop.org/default.asp?pt=newsdescr&RI=211; John Curran, Sex-offender Zones 
Assailed – Critics Say Ordinances Limiting Where Offenders can Live are Ineffective and too 
Broad, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 22, 2005, at B01.  The town of Brick, New Jersey, included 
school bus stops in its list of locations an offender is prohibited from living 2,500 feet from.  Id.  
“With more than 2,000 bus stops . . . the measure effectively bars offenders from living anywhere in 
the town.”  Id.  “It’s pretty tough, if someone introduces an ordinance like this, to vote no,” said 
Brick Mayor Joseph Scarpelli.  Id.  “I know they’ll probably have a case that tests all these 
ordinances, and there’s a good possibility a lot will be thrown out as unconstitutional.  But it makes 
a town feel that they care about their children.”  Id. 
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legitimate interests of “the others.”4  When such laws are passed and the 
political process is broken, it is necessary for the judicial branch to step 
forward and protect those who are politically impotent.5 
When it comes to laws that involve sex offenders, the passions of 
the majority must be tempered with reason.  Overborne by a mob 
mentality for justice, officials at every level of government are enacting 
laws that effectively exile convicted sex offenders from their midst with 
little contemplation as to the appropriateness or constitutionality of their 
actions.  Politicians across the country will approve almost any measure 
that deals with sex offenders to appear strong on crime.6  Given that the 
sex offender lobby is neither large nor vocal, it will be up to the courts to 
protect the interests of this disenfranchised group.7 
This article does not dispute the idea that sex offenders should be 
dealt with harshly.  But there has to be a time when enough is enough.  
The law should provide some opportunity for repentance.8  Individuals 
make mistakes, but they should be allowed an opportunity to change.  
Individuals like Lori Sue Collins, who after serving three years for 
having sex with a teenage boy, found God.9  Upon her release, she 
worked as the residence director at the Door of Hope, a halfway house 
for sex offenders.10  She believed her calling was to help others like her 
 
 4. See The Other, Otherness, and Alterity, http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/ 
themes/other.html (last modified: April 8, 2002). 
 5. See Wayne A. Logan, “Democratic Despotism” and Constitutional Constraint: An 
Empirical Analysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 439, 
495-96 (2004). 
 6. See Lee Rood, New Data Shows Twice as Many Sex Offenders Missing, DES MOINES 
REGISTER & TRIBUNE, Jan. 22, 2006 (quoting state Sen. Dick Deardon, Dem. who thought sex 
offender registration requirement would be “difficult to change” since “[n]o one wants a postcard to 
come out two weeks before the election saying they are lax on sex offenders”). 
 7. Relying on politicians to act against their constituents’ wishes to benefit an unpopular 
minority is wishful thinking. “There is obviously little legislative hay to be made in cultivating the 
multiple murderer vote.”  Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 522 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964) (standing for the proposition 
that the political process should be balanced and fair to everyone, providing “one person, one 
vote”). 
 8. See, e.g., State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443 (Alaska 1970) (“The primary goal of such 
legislation is an attempt to implement Alaska’s constitutional mandate that [p]enal administration 
shall be based on the principle of reformation and upon the need for protecting the public.”) 
(citation omitted).  See also ALA. CODE § 13A-1-3(5)-(6) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.) 
(stating that the purpose of the criminal code is “[t]o insure the public safety by . . . the 
rehabilitation of those convicted . . . [t]o prevent the arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons 
accused or convicted of offenses”). 
 9. Complaint ¶ 39, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-cv-140-CC, (N.D. Ga. June 20, 2006), 
available at http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059_litigation/LegalDocuments/ 
HB1059_Complaint.pdf. 
 10. Id. ¶ 38. 
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turn away from the sins of their past and live as productive members of 
society.11  But because the Door of Hope is located within 1,000 feet of a 
school bus stop, Lori had to quit her job and move because of residence 
and employment restrictions.12 
This article will look at why sex offenders are treated differently 
than other criminal offenders.  Sex offenders are subject to sanctions and 
prohibitions above and beyond what other criminal offenders must face.  
Next, the article will look at some of the residence and employment 
restrictions placed on sex offenders to determine if they are rationally 
related to any legitimate government interest without overbearing the 
sex offender’s constitutional rights.  Finally, the article will offer an 
alternate means of sex offense prevention that encourages sex offender 
assimilation back into society instead of further exclusion. 
This article will focus on those individuals who have been 
classified as sex offenders and who have successfully completed their 
sentence, however long it may have been.  This article does not deal 
with laws aimed at restricting the freedom of individuals released on 
probation or parole.  Any type of supervised release is a contractual 
agreement between the individual and the state and any rights an 
individual wishes to waive to have some limited degree of freedom are 
within the individual’s discretion and the state’s prerogative to require.  
There is no such bargain for those who have completed their sentence.  
Society has an obligation to those who have paid their debt for the 
wrong committed to accept a convict’s repentance.13  There should be at 
least some opportunity for that individual to assimilate back into society.  
However, the residence and employment laws currently promulgated by 
twenty-four states and many other local communities around the country 
serve only to exile those who desire a second chance at life.14  Instead of 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. ¶ 40. 
 13. Provided that the offender has served his/her time and actually seeks to turn away from 
his/her previous deviant behavior. 
 14. There are nineteen states with residence restrictions, not a condition of 
probation/parole/supervision, in order of enactment or latest amendments.  The terms in parentheses 
indicate whether the classification is Offense Driven (OD), Registration Driven (RD), or applies to 
Sexually Violent Predators (SVP). Delaware (July 25, 1995) (OD); Alabama (Sept. 1, 1999) (OD); 
Illinois (July 7, 2000) (OD, SVP); Louisiana (June 28, 2001) (SVP); Iowa (July 1, 2002) (OD); 
Arkansas (July 16, 2003) (RD+SVP); Ohio (July 31, 2003) (OD); Oklahoma (Nov. 1, 2003) (RD); 
Tennessee (June 8, 2004) (RD); Missouri (June 14, 2004) (OD); Florida (Oct. 1, 2004) (OD); 
Michigan (Jan. 1, 2006) (RD); Georgia (July 1, 2006) (RD); Idaho (July 1, 2006) (RD); Indiana 
(July 1, 2006) (RD); Mississippi (July 1, 2006) (RD); South Dakota (July 1, 2006) (RD); Virginia 
(July 1, 2006) (OD); Kentucky (July 12, 2006) (RD). See infra Table 1 for citations.  Eight 
states have a residence restriction as a condition of probation/parole/supervision: ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
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protecting society, these laws actually push individuals into antisocial 
behavior and likely back into trouble with the law.  But besides simply 
being bad public policy, these laws are contrary to the ordered scheme of 
liberty that we hold so dear.  As Justice McKenna so eloquently put it 
almost 100 years ago: 
His prison bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, 
but he goes from them to a perpetual limitation of his liberty.  He is 
forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice 
and view of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his 
domicile without giving notice to the “authority immediately in charge 
of his surveillance,” and without permission in writing.  He may not 
seek, even in other scenes and among other people, to retrieve his fall 
from rectitude.  Even that hope is taken from him, and he is subject to 
tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and 
stonewalls, oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of 
essential liberty.15 
I. WHO IS A SEX OFFENDER? 
A lawbreaker is a sex offender if he or she is guilty of one of the 
many enumerated crimes that constitute a sex offense.  The definition of 
what is a sex offense is set forth by statute and varies from state to state.  
In some states the list is short, while in others the list is extensive.  The 
status of being a sex offender may not be limited to individuals with 
felony convictions.  Even a Class A misdemeanor conviction can result 
in being labeled a sex offender.16  For most states there is a three prong 
 
§ 41-1604.07(F) (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 910 
of 2006 Reg. Sess.); FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 948.30(1)(b) (2006); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-4(g)(2)(B) (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-2.2(2) (West 2006); LA. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15:538(D)(1)(c) (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642(1)(a) (2006); TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2006); W. VA. CODE § 62-12-26(b)(1) (2006). 
 15. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910). 
 16. For example, in Illinois, where the residence restrictions is offense driven, one of the 
offenses is “indecent solicitation of an adult.”  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5) (2006).  A 
person who arranges for a person 17 years of age or over to commit an act of sexual conduct with a 
person 13 or older but under 17 commits a Class A misdemeanor.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/11-6.5 
(2006).  In Michigan, a second or subsequent conviction for indecent exposure subjects you to the 
residence restriction.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.722(e)(iii) (2006).  Indecent exposure is a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment up to two years, or a fine up to $2,000, or both. MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 750.335a(2)(b) (2006).  In Missouri, furnishing pornographic material to minors 
subjects you to the residence restriction.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147(1) (West 2006).  Furnishing 
pornographic material to minors is a Class A misdemeanor.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 573.040(2) (West 
2006).  Indecent exposure subjects you to the residence restriction in Oklahoma.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 57, § 582(A) (West 2006).  Although the crime is categorized as a felony, the punishment ranges 
4
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designation for sex offender registration which subjects them to the 
residence and employment restrictions.  A sex offender typically is a 
person convicted of a sexually violent offense, deemed a sexually 
violent predator, or convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who 
is a minor.17 
The interesting aspect about this classification scheme as it relates 
to residence and employment restrictions is that for two of the three 
categories it does not matter whether the victim of the underlying crime 
is a child.  So a person who is convicted of sex abuse against another 
adult is prohibited from living or working where children congregate as 
if he or she were a child molester.  Focusing on the child victim is not 
clear enough either.  Some states limit the status of “sex offender” to 
“child sex offender” in which case only crimes where the victim is a 
minor are considered.18  Crimes against adults are not used in that 
particular classification.19  For this classification, it does not matter if 
there is any sexual intent involved—only that the victim of the crime is a 
child.  For these restrictions to be rationally related to the interests of 
protecting children from sexual criminals, the crimes which classify 
convicts as sex offenders should at a minimum include a sexual act and a 
child.20 
 
from a fine of $500 to $20,000, imprisonment from 30 days to 10 years, or both.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 21, § 1021(A) (West 2006).  You could plead guilty, pay a $500 fine, and be forced out of your 
home. 
 17. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.1 (West 2006). 
 18. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(c)(1) (defining a “child sex offender” as a 
“person who[] (i) has been charged . . . with a sex offense . . . or the attempt to commit an included 
sex offense, and (A) is convicted . . . (B) is found not guilty by reason of insanity . . . or (D) is the 
subject of a finding not resulting in an acquittal at a hearing . . . or (ii) is certified as a sexually 
dangerous person . . . when any conduct giving rise to such certification is committed or attempted 
against a person less than 18 years of age . . . .”). 
 19. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5) (defining sex offenses as child luring, 
aiding and abetting in child abduction, indecent solicitation of a child, indecent solicitation of an 
adult, soliciting for a juvenile prostitution, keeping a place of juvenile prostitution, patronizing a 
juvenile prostitute, juvenile pimping, exploitation of a child, child pornography, predatory criminal 
sexual assault of a child, ritualized abuse of a child, criminal sexual assault (when victim under 18 
years of age), aggravated criminal sexual assault (when victim under 18 years of age), aggravated 
criminal sexual abuse (when victim under 18 years of age),  criminal sexual abuse (when victim 
under 18 years of age), kidnapping (when victim under 18 years of age and defendant not parent), 
aggravated kidnapping (when victim under 18 years of age and defendant not parent), unlawful 
restraint (when victim under 18 years of age and defendant not parent), aggravated unlawful 
restraint (when victim under 18 years of age and defendant not parent), and an attempt to commit 
any of the aforementioned offenses). 
 20. See Raines v. State, 805 So.2d 999, 1003 (Fla. App. 4th 2001) (holding that “including an 
offender convicted of false imprisonment in the definition of ‘sexual offender,’ without a 
concomitant sexual component, renders the sexual offender registration statute overinclusive” and 
in violation of equal protection). 
5
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Many people may think of sex offenders as “dirty old men prowling 
the streets,” but with the wide spectrum of offenses that automatically 
lead to being classified as a sex offender, many times sex offenders are 
decent people who made a mistake.21  Take Wendy Whitaker, for 
example.22  At 17, she had consensual sexual relations with a 15-year-
old boy.23  Now 26, and without any other mark on her criminal record, 
she is a sex offender who is captured under Georgia’s sex offender 
restrictions.24  Or Jay Hikes, who at the age of 19 had consensual sex 
with a 15-year-old girl in New Jersey.25  Now 36, married and with a 
small child, he too will be caught up in the broad net of sex offender 
residence and employment restrictions.26  Silly mistakes and actions that 
many people other would not have had qualms about doing could earn 
individual the sex offender label.27  So, it is not just those who commit 
rape, incest, and sex abuse who are branded a sex offender.  There is a 
significant probability that individuals with little potential to re-offend 
are treated the same as those who actually are predators.28 
In the handful of states where there are sex offender employment 
and residence restrictions, sex offender status can be earned 
automatically with a conviction of a particular crime.  In Alabama, for 
example, a conviction, even a nolo contendere plea, of the following will 
result in sex offender classification:  rape in the first or second degree; 
sodomy in the first or second degree; sexual torture; sex abuse in the 
first or second degree; enticing a child to enter a vehicle, room, house, 
office, or other place for immoral purposes; promoting prostitution in the 
 
 21. See, e.g., Jenny Jarvie, Suit Target’s Georgia Sex Offender Law, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 
2006, at A24. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Doug Nurse, Many Feel Impact of New Sex Offender Law, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 6, 
2006. 
 26. Id. 
 27. A sex offender could just be a person who committed a mischievous act such as mooning 
or streaking. See generally, Kaffie Sledge, Labels May Mislead, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER, 
June 29, 2006.  “For instance, if reported, relieving oneself outdoors (behind a tree on the golf 
course or behind a building) could result in being charged with a sex offense. It’s a misdemeanor if 
the witness is an adult; a felony if witnessed by a minor.” Id. 
 28. Sometimes innocent fun can be criminal.  8-Year-Old Charged For Sexual Conduct With 
Sitter, (KUTV television broadcast July 28, 2005), available at 
http://kutv.com/topstories/local_story_210004013.html.  For example, a fourteen-year-old female 
baby-sitter “dared” the 8-year-old boy, in a game of truth-or-dare, to touch her breasts, which he 
did.  Id.  When he told his mother about it, she called the police and both the eight-year-old boy and 
the fourteen-year-old baby-sitter where charged with lewdness with a minor.  Id. The charges were 
later dropped. Id. 
6
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first or second degree; violation of the Alabama Child Pornography Act; 
kidnapping of a minor, except by a parent, in the first or second degree; 
incest, when the offender is an adult and the victim is a minor; soliciting 
a child by computer for the purposes of committing a sexual act and 
transmitting obscene material to a child by computer; any solicitation, 
attempt, or conspiracy to commit any of the aforementioned offenses29 
and a conviction for any criminal sex offense when the victim was under 
the age of 12 and any offense involving child pornography.30 
Sex offender status is painted with a broad brush, marking more 
individuals than necessary.  The label is one that should be avoided at all 
costs.  As a result, statutes that require automatic inclusion by those 
convicted of particular crimes will likely make convictions for those 
crimes more difficult to come by.  As the time frame for potential 
punishment is extended, many individuals accused of such crimes will 
not be willing to accept a guilty plea regardless of the suggested 
punishment.31  The status of being a sex offender is a long-term, even a 
lifetime, marking.  Such a stigma should be very narrowly applied, if at 
all. 
II. WHY ALL THE FUSS OVER THIS CRIME? 
Sex offenders are a special cast of criminals that excite the general 
public more than other run-of-the-mill criminals.32  The combination of 
sex and violence makes for a story line that sells.33  Readers and viewers 
are titillated by these often NC-17 rated stories.  Throw a story line that 
includes children into the mix with sex and violence and you have a 
potential to create a lynch mob.  Stories of just a few abused children 
can unite the public to demand change.34  Media attention can blow a 
 
 29. ALA. CODE § 15-20-21(4) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 30. Id. § 15-20-21(5). 
 31. Even an offer of probated sentence might be rejected as a matter of course if the sex 
offender label must attach.  The fewer plea bargains the more trials.  One might speculate that 
within a brief period of time the bulk of the criminal cases tried will be sex offenses. 
 32. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through 
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 881-82 (2000). “Stories about crime involving children 
in particular tap into a complex of concerns about modern life. Indeed, it is noteworthy that so many 
of the moral panics of the nineties involved children in either a victim or an offender role (or in the 
case of drug use, both victim and offender).” Id. 
 33. Popular television shows such as Law & Order: Special Victims Unit or Dateline NBC 
use sex stories to capture and audience. 
 34. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 
587. 
SEC. 2. IN RECOGNITION OF JOHN AND REVÉ WALSH ON THE OCCASION OF 
THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF ADAM WALSH’S ABDUCTION AND MURDER. 
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situation out of proportion so that it appears that isolated events are 
really an epidemic.35  The laws often reflect the plight of the particular 
 
(a) ADAM WALSH’S ABDUCTION AND MURDER.—On July 27, 1981, in 
Hollywood, Florida, 6-year-old Adam Walsh was abducted at a mall. Two weeks later, 
some of Adam’s remains were discovered in a canal more than 100 miles from his home. 
Id. at 589. 
SEC. 102. DECLARATION OF PURPOSE. 
In order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in 
response to the vicious attacks by violent predators against the victims listed below, 
Congress in this Act establishes a comprehensive national system for the registration of 
those offenders: 
(1) Jacob Wetterling, who was 11 years old, was abducted in 1989 in Minnesota, and 
remains missing. 
(2) Megan Nicole Kanka, who was 7 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and 
murdered in 1994, in New Jersey. 
(3) Pam Lychner, who was 31 years old, was attacked by a career offender in Houston, 
Texas. 
(4) Jetseta Gage, who was 10 years old, was kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and 
murdered in 2005, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. 
(5) Dru Sjodin, who was 22 years old, was sexually assaulted and murdered in 2003, in 
North Dakota. 
(6) Jessica Lunsford, who was 9 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, buried 
alive, and murdered in 2005, in Homosassa, Florida. 
(7) Sarah Lunde, who was 13 years old, was strangled and murdered in 2005, in Ruskin, 
Florida. 
(8) Amie Zyla, who was 8 years old, was sexually assaulted in 1996 by a juvenile 
offender in Waukesha, Wisconsin, and has become an advocate for child victims and 
protection of children from juvenile sex offenders. 
(9) Christy Ann Fornoff, who was 13 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and 
murdered in 1984, in Tempe, Arizona. 
(10) Alexandra Nicole Zapp, who was 30 years old, was brutally attacked and murdered 
in a public restroom by a repeat sex offender in 2002, in Bridgewater, Massachusetts. 
(11) Polly Klaas, who was 12 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered 
in 1993 by a career offender in California. 
(12) Jimmy Ryce, who was 9 years old, was kidnapped and murdered in Florida on 
September 11, 1995. 
(13) Carlie Brucia, who was 11 years old, was abducted and murdered in Florida in 
February, 2004. 
(14) Amanda Brown, who was 7 years old, was abducted and murdered in Florida in 
1998. 
(15) Elizabeth Smart, who was 14 years old, was abducted in Salt Lake City, Utah in 
June 2002. 
(16) Molly Bish, who was 16 years old, was abducted in 2000 while working as a 
lifeguard in Warren, Massachusetts, where her remains were found 3 years later. 
(17) Samantha Runnion, who was 5 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and 
murdered in California on July 15, 2002. 
Id. at 590-91. 
 35. For example, anytime there is a shark attack, news coverage of such an event gives people 
a false perception that shark attacks are common.  Jennifer Hile, Great White Shark Attacks: 
Defanging the Myths, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC CHANNEL, Jan. 23, 2004, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/01/0123_040123_tvgreatwhiteshark.html.  In 
8
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child who precipitated the law by carrying their names, such as Kyle, 
Megan, or Jessica.36 
Crimes involving sex, especially when the victim is a child, are 
perceived as more heinous crimes because the degree of violation of our 
personal privacy and innocence.  Victims of sex crimes rarely just walk 
away from the incident without some physical or emotional scarring.  In 
fact, nearly one-third of all rape victims, regardless of age, suffer some 
sort of post-traumatic stress disorder.37 
Anger is easily stirred against those who commit sex crimes.  Sex 
offenders are not even honored among thieves.38  It is not uncommon for 
prisoners to dole out jailhouse justice to those who commit sex crimes, 
 
reality, the likelihood of being attacked by a shark is extremely rare. From 1670 to 2001 there were 
only 2,110 reported shark attacks worldwide. Shark Attacks, 
http://www.sharkattackphotos.com/Images/Misc/attackmap.jpg.  See also C.T. Sharp, Letter to the 
Editor, C’mon, ST. LOUIS JOURNALISM REV., Dec. 2003-Jan 2004.  
In November, KSDK (Channel 5) promoted a story about sex offenders living near 
school bus stops as if it had discovered a plague epidemic in St. Louis.  I know that 
November is sweeps month, but this promo was ridiculous. . . It has to be at the top of 
the list of sensationalistic non-stories fabricated by Channel 5. 
Id. 
 36. See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended as 42 
U.S.C. § 14071 (2006); The Jacob Wetterling Disappearance, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., 
August 3, 2006, at 1A, available at 2006 WLNR 13423673.  See also Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 
104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (naming a law after Megan Nicole Kanka); L. Steinhamilton, 
Megan’s Law Interests Britain, STAR-LEDGER, July 23, 2006, at 29, available at 2006 WLNR 
12671260; Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
236, 110 Stat. 3093 (1996) (codified as amended as 42 U.S.C. § 14072 (2006); Jimmy Ryce 
Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators’ Treatment and Care Act, 1996 Fla. 
Laws 338 (1996); David Hancock, Kidnappers Are Seldom Strangers, CBSNEWS.COM, June 19, 2002, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/19/national/main512745.shtml); Jessica Lunsford Act, 2005 Fla. Laws 28 
(2005); Gary Fineout & Mary Ellen Klas, Dead Kids are Campaign Fodder for Crist, MIAMI 
HERALD, Aug. 3, 2006, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/15184792.htm.; 
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006); 
Roberto Santiago & Wanda J. Demarzo, New Law Marks Adam Walsh Case Anniversary: On the 
Anniversary of 6-year-old Adam Walsh’s Abduction, President Bush Today Will Sign an Act 
Creating a National Sex Offender Registry, MIAMI HERALD, July 27, 2006, available at 
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/15184792.htm. 
 37. NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, RAPE-RELATED POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
(2002), 
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentAction=ViewProperti
es&DocumentID=32366&UrlToReturn=http%3a%2f%2fwww.ncvc.org%2fncvc%2fmain.aspx%3f
dbName%3dAdvancedSearch. 
 38. Sex offenders, especially child sex offenders, are treated poorly in prison.  See HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS pt. IV (2001), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report4.html#N_222_.  Among prisoners, sex offenders are 
considered the lowest prisoners of all.  Id. 
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especially if the crime involved a minor.39  Up until June 2006, in 
Illinois, the sex offender classification included those who murder 
children.40  A child-murderer’s mother asked for and received a new 
separate classification because she did not want her son to be labeled as 
a sex offender because of the stigma.41  When abusing a child is 
considered worse than murdering a child, there is little doubt the term 
“sex offender” brands a deep mark. 
Finally, there is a dangerousness myth that surrounds sex 
offenders.42  Studies in the 1970s and 1980s that suggested sex offender 
recidivism was not affected by treatment led many to the conclusion that 
there was nothing that could be done to curb the deviant behavior.43  
Couple the misuse of research data with a media that sensationalizes sex 
crimes and sex offenders, and it is no wonder the public sentiment 
against sex offenders is so high.44 
 
 39. See id. (discussing the targeting of prisoners convicted of sexually abusing minors).  For 
example, one inmate said,  
Inmates confined for sexual offenses, especially those against juvenile victims, are at the 
bottom of the pecking order and consequentially most often victimized. Because of their 
crime, the general population justifies using their weakness by labeling rape ‘just 
punishment’ for their crime. Sexual offenders are the number one target group for 
prisoner rape. 
Id. 
 40. Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification Law, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
152/101 (1996) (amended 2006). 
 41. Jocelyn Black, Illinois House and Senate Agree to Send ‘Sex Offender Only’ Bill, MEDILL 
NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 6, 2006, available at 
http://mesh.medill.northwestern.edu/mnschicago/archives/2006/04/sexoffdb_the_il.html.  On June 
27, 2006, the governor signed into law the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth 
Registration Act. The Act provides for the registration of persons who were previously registered as 
sex offenders under the Sex Offender Registration Act for the offenses of kidnapping, aggravated 
kidnapping, unlawful restraint, aggravated unlawful restraint, first degree murder, child abduction, 
and forcible detention when those offenses were committed against persons under 18 years of age.  
See Child Murder and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act,  Pub. Act 94-945, 2006 Ill. 
Laws 945. 
State rep. John Fritchey (D-Chicago) introduced the bill in November 2005.  He said that 
he was inspired by a woman, whose son would have to register as a sex offender even 
though his murder conviction didn’t have anything to do with a sexual crime. “As a 
father, I know firsthand how terrifying the words ‘sex offender’ are to a parent and I 
have zero tolerance for those individuals,” Rep. Fritchey said in a press release. “But 
we’re essentially talking about truth in labeling here. We were attaching a very powerful 
and inaccurate stigma to someone whose transgression did not warrant it. He was 
essentially facing a second sentence for a crime he did not commit.” 
Black, supra. 
 42. See Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abuse, Facts About Adult Sex Offenders 
(2001), http://www.atsa.com/ppOffenderFacts.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing Commission’s 
Obligation to Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders, 87 IOWA L. REV. 563, 569 (2002). 
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III. COMPARATIVE RECIDIVISM RATES 
Contrary to popular public opinion, the recidivism rate for sex 
crimes is no worse than the recidivism rate for other crimes.45  In fact, 
sex offense recidivism is extremely low compared to recidivism for 
other crimes.46  According to the Department of Justice’s statistics of sex 
offender recidivism, 5.3 percent of sex offenders were rearrested for a 
sex offense within three years of their release.47  Forty-three percent of 
convicted sex offenders were arrested for all crimes during this same 
period, but the overwhelming majority of those arrests were for other 
non-sexual allegations.48  Also, using arrests as proof of behavior is 
misleading because those with a criminal record are often the first ones 
blamed for new criminal activity. 
While a 24 percent recidivism rate49 might sound high, using it as a 
call to arms when most other crimes have a similar propensity or worse 
is fallacious.  For example, 67 percent of drug convicts are rearrested 
within three years with a conviction rate of 47 percent,50 yet there is no 
restriction keeping drug offenders from living or working near schools.  
While most states have laws that enhance a drug crime if it takes place 
within a certain distance from a school, there is nothing to prevent drug 
offenders from living there after they are released.51  Thus, sex offender 
employment and residence restrictions are either precursors of what is to 
come to all criminal offenders or a special sanction for only the sex 
offender. 
 
 45. See IOWA DEP’T OF HUM. RIGHTS, DIV. OF CRIM. & JUV. JUSTICE PLANNING & 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., IOWA SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY AND RECIDIVISM (2000); PATRICK 
A. LANGAN, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM 
PRISON IN 1994 14, (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.  “The 
43% re-arrest rate of the 9,691 released sex offenders was low by comparison.” Id. 
 46. See PATRICK A. LANGAM & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF 
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 (2002). 
 47. Id. at 1. 
 48. Id. at 2, 14. 
 49. Id. at 14 (“the reconviction rate for . . . 9,691 released sex offenders was 24.0%. . . .”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6314(b)(3-4) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Reg. 
Sess.).  
In addition to the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in subsection (a), the person 
shall be sentenced to an additional minimum sentence of at least two years total 
confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the 
contrary, if the person did any of the following: . . . 3) Committed the offense within 
1,000 feet of the real property on which is located a public, private or parochial school or 
a college or university. (4) Committed the offense on a school bus or within 500 feet of a 
school bus stop. 
Id. 
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Data can be used to mislead.  As often stated, there are “lies, damn 
lies – and statistics.”52  The data collected for sex offender recidivism 
could fit into all three categories.  The Department of Justice is guilty of 
misleading the public with non-informative information.  In its 
introduction and highlights section the report lists that “sex offenders are 
four times more likely to be arrested for a new sex crime” than non-sex 
offenders.53  Statistics make this true because only 1.3 percent of the 
non-sex offenders committed sex crimes.54  Looking at the raw numbers, 
the actual incidences of sexual recidivism is much greater for the non-
sex offenders than the sex offenders.55  So, with all the focus on the 
convicted sex offenders, we miss approximately 86.5 percent of the new 
sex crimes.56 
IV. RESTRICTIONS 
With the belief that proximity leads to promiscuity, twenty-four 
states, including California, which recently joined the fray, currently 
have some form of residence and/or employment restrictions for 
convicted sex offenders.57  These restrictions may last for only the 
designated period of supervised release or apply for the remainder of an 
offender’s life.58  Nineteen states have residence and/or employment 
restrictions that apply beyond the period of any probation or parole 
period.59  In some states these restrictions are permanent, with no 
process or ability to remove the burden.60  These restrictions have 
disastrous effects on convicted sex offenders who are trying to be decent 
 
 52. Quote . . . Unquote, The Most Quoted Remarks, http://www1c.btwebworld.com/quote-
unquote/p0000149.htm  (last visited Nov. 11, 2006) (quoting MARK TWAIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
(1924)). Twain gives credit for the quote to Disraeli.  Id. 
 53. LANGAM ET AL., supra note 45, at 1. 
 54. Id.  A percent of 5.3 is four times more than 1.3 percent, but neither is very high.  Id. 
 55. Id.  Five hundred-seventeen of 9,691 sex offenders were rearrested for a new sex crime 
within three years compared to 3,328 out of 262,420 non-sex offenders.  Id. 
 56. Id.  Of the 3,845 new sex crime arrests, 3,328 were from non-sex offenders.  Id. 
 57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.) (codifying California 
Ballot Initiative Proposition 83, available at http://ca.lwv.org/lwvc/edfund/elections/2006nov/ 
id/prop83.html). 
 58. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-33(a) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.) (setting the 
restrictive period at life); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(1) (2006) (setting the restrictive period at 10 
years). 
 59. See supra note 14. 
 60. For example, Iowa has no means for a sex offender subject to residence and employment 
restrictions to ever have those restrictions lifted.  IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A (West 2006). See 
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003)) (“[T]here is no requirement that the State provide a process to establish an 
exemption from a legislative classification.”). 
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members of the community.  Often they are forced to quit their jobs and 
move.61  By having these restrictions, a state’s public policy 
demonstrates a preference for sex offenders to be unemployed and living 
in an “RV in old K-Mart parking lot” or in a “truck near the river” or 
“under the 7th street bridge.”62  With these laws, sex offenders are 
forced to live nomadic lives. 
It is not uncommon to have laws that prevent activities from taking 
place within a certain distance of a school, church, or residential area.63  
What is unique about these restrictions is the lack of any criminal desire 
required.64  These zoning restrictions do not involve a crime, as in the 
case with selling or possessing drugs or guns near schools.65  In this 
case, the mere physical presence of a former sex offender is the offense.  
The thrust of the injustice in these laws is against those who have 
completed their sentence and are not released as parolees or 
probationers.  It is these individuals who are ready to start their lives 
over; but with these residence and employment restrictions hanging over 
their heads, they will have a difficult time assimilating. 
A.  Residence 
Nineteen states66 and many other local communities have enacted 
residence restrictions on former sex offenders, prohibiting them from 
living a certain distance away from schools,67 child-care facilities,68 
public swimming pools,69 public playgrounds,70 churches, or any area 
 
 61. See Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: 
1,000 Feet From Danger or One Step From Absurd? 49 INT’L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. 
CRIMINOLOGY 168 (2005). 
 62. These are actual responses by individuals forced to move and list their new address with 
their sex offender treatment providers in Iowa.  See Kansas Dep’t of Corrections, Twenty Findings 
of Research on Residential Restrictions for Sex Offenders and the Iowa Experience with Similar 
Policies, 
http://www.dc.state.ks.us/SOHR/Twenty_Findings_on_Restrictions_for_Sex_Offenders.htm (last 
visited March 7, 2007). 
 63. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.115(1) (2006) (prohibiting a firearm or weapon within 1,000 
feet of a school); Id. § 790.115(2)(b) (prohibiting the possession of an electric weapon or device, 
destructive device, or other weapon on school property); Id. § 790.115(2)(c) (prohibiting the 
possession a firearm on school property). 
 64. § 790.115. 
 65. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:11-5 (West 2006) (stating that death by vehicular 
manslaughter is worse if the perpetrator was intoxicated and the victim was on school grounds). 
 66. See infra Table 1. 
 67. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (2006). 
 70. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545(1) (West 2006). 
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where minors congregate, such as parks, arcades, and even school bus 
stops.71  Restrictions from living 500, 1,000, 1,500 or 2,000 feet from the 
above mentioned areas seems like a quick and simple fix to the 
perceived recidivism problem.  However, this final solution actually 
solves nothing while presenting a host of new problems, the least of 
which is a violation of the individual’s constitutional rights. 
The residence restrictions are typically from property line to 
property line and not door-to-door, so the prohibited area is often larger 
than one might expect.72  Communities that have restrictions of 2,000 
feet essentially block out all of the urban areas as the overlapping 
bubbles leave few, if any, reasonable places to reside.73  A quick look at 
an urban area map will demonstrate how such restrictions severely limit 
housing options for sex offenders.74  The purpose, it seems, is to drive 
sex offenders out of the community.  Some legislators are even so 
brazen as to admit such intent.75  Whether or not banishment is the 
purpose, it is the result. 
Among the states that have residence restrictions, there is some 
discrepancy in determining which sex offenders qualify for residence 
restrictions.  In Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee, the residence restrictions are 
registration driven.76  In other words, all individuals who have to register 
as sex offenders are subject to residence restrictions.77  In Alabama, 
Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, and Ohio, the residence restrictions are offense 
driven, so the application is not as facially broad, but it is still 
significant.78  In Louisiana, the residence restrictions apply only to those 
 
 71. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2006).  See also infra Table 1. 
 72. In Georgia, the distance is measured from the property boundary of the sex offender’s 
residence to the property boundary of the child care facility, school, or area where minors 
congregate, at their closest points. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (2006).  But in Kentucky, the 
measurement is taken in a straight line from the nearest wall of the school to the nearest wall of the 
registrant’s place of residence. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545. 
 73. By reasonable, I mean an affordable, safe living space.  It is not reasonable to say that an 
individual has a theoretical option to move to a certain neighborhood when the cost of living space 
far exceeds the individual’s financial means.  Likewise, it is not reasonable to force people to move 
into a “high crime area.” 
 74. See infra app. 1. 
 75. See e.g., Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 56. 
 76. See infra Table 1. 
 77. In Arkansas, being subject to registration is just the first part of the analysis.  A registrant 
will also have to be declared dangerous with a score of three or four on a four point scale. ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006). 
 78. See infra Table 1.  It would be possible for a person to be classified as a sex offender for 
registration purposes but not subject to residence or employment restrictions—like in Arkansas and 
Louisiana. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (2006). While 
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classified as sexually violent predators.79  Arizona, California, Florida, 
Oregon, and Texas have residence restrictions only as part of probation 
or parole or some other form of supervised release.80  Indiana has 
enacted a more broadly applicable restriction, but the previous law 
regarding parolees remains in effect.81 
Washington and Nebraska are unique in that there is no overarching 
state mandate for residence and employment restrictions with the actual 
decision on restrictions left up to the local communities.  The state does 
provide some guidance and limitations as to how far the communities 
can go.82  Washington imposed a residence restriction on sex offenders 
as a condition of community custody.83  The offender could not reside 
within 880 feet from the facilities or grounds of a public or private 
school.84 In 2006, Washington established a committee to develop 
statewide standards for cities and towns to use when determining 
whether to impose residency restrictions on sex offenders.85  Nebraska 
defers to and provides guidance for local communities that enact 
residency restrictions.86  State legislation signed into law on April 13, 
2006, allows cities to prohibit a high-risk sex offender whose victim was 
18 years of age or younger from living within 500 feet of a school or 
child care facility.87 
States that do not have a formal statewide restriction may have 
local ordinances that vary in degree from town to town.88  Logistically, 
communities, if left to their own devices, often take harsher stances 
against sex offenders to ensure that there is little or no available housing 
since the effect of not having such prohibitions will be felt in a smaller 
 
this is a variation in classification it can have the same effect if all the enumerated offenses that 
subject one to registration are also the same that apply to the residence and employment 
restrictions—like in Alabama where all those that have to register are subject to the residence 
requirements. ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(a), 15-20-21(1) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 79. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A). 
 80. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.07(F) (LexisNexis 2006), CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 910 of 2006 Reg. Sess.), FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2006); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 144.642(1)(a) (2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2006). 
 81. IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-4(g)(2)(B) (West 2006). 
 82. See S.B. 6325, 59th 2d Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005). 
 83. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.712(6)(a)(ii) (2006). 
 84. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(8) (2006). This provision expired July 1, 2006.  Id. 
 85. See S.B. 6325. 
 86. See, e.g., Legis. B. 1199, 99th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2005). 
 87. See id. §§ 27-29. 
 88. See, e.g., Pamela A. MacLean, Suit Tests Power of Sex Offender Bans, Six Cities Want to 
Copy Law; They Wait For Result, 28 NAT’L L.J. 6, Oct. 3, 2005, at col. 2; Associated Press, Cuero 
Wants to Require Sex Offenders to Post Yard Signs, KLTV, Jan. 6, 2006, available at 
http://kltv.com/global/story.asp?s=4247289&ClientType=Printable. 
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community.  In such cases where only local ordinances exist, notice can 
be a problem.89 
B.  Employment 
Along with residence restrictions, several states and local 
communities have also enacted employment restrictions intended to keep 
sex offenders away from schools, daycare facilities, playgrounds, public 
swimming pools, video arcades, recreation centers, or public athletic 
fields and the like.90  Similar to the residence restrictions, this is 
employment zoning.  Not only are sex offenders prohibited from 
working at these locations, but they are also prohibited from working 
near these locations.91  Because most sex offenses against children are 
committed by individuals who have a prior relationship with their 
victims, there is a rational basis for keeping child offenders out of 
relationship-building type jobs such as a teacher or counselor at a 
school.92  But when the law places a barrier around schools and 
playgrounds that blocks off large sections of the community, the impact 
of this restriction for employment purposes is enormous and 
unnecessary. 
Jobs that require workers to work at new locations on a regular 
basis such as plumbers, electricians, and construction are now off-limits 
to convicted sex offenders because of the risk of inadvertently entering 
the restricted zones.  Downtown areas will be off-limits to prior 
offenders who are attorneys or accountants or who hold other white-
collar jobs.  With just one daycare facility located on one floor of a high-
rise building, an entire city block could be off-limits. For all practical 
purposes, sex offenders will be relegated to agricultural work on the 
outskirts of the community.  If that is not feasible, then unemployment is 
the natural consequence of these restrictions. 
As a matter of public policy, it is strange to prefer idleness over 
work.  While unemployment is not the stated objective of these 
restrictions, it is often the result.  Being productive is a key component 
 
 89. WOI-TV, Sex Offender’s Wife Worries About Family Future, Nov. 23, 2005, available at 
http://www.woi-tv.com/Global/story.asp?S=4056859&nav=1LFX.  “The Story County attorney 
says his county first started drawing up maps about a month ago. Since then, they’ve changed it 
about twenty times. As of Monday, their map still isn’t finalized. That leaves sex offenders who 
know they need to move, not knowing where they can go.” Id. 
 90. See infra Table 3. 
 91. See infra Table 3. 
 92. CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX 
OFFENDERS (2000). 
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to successful rehabilitation and in preventing recidivism.93  Employment 
plays a significant role in an individual’s feeling of self-worth.94  Taking 
away a person’s ability to work attacks that person’s dignity.  With no 
documented proof that working in proximity to children increases sex 
crimes, it is odd that courts have done nothing to stop governments from 
interfering with the essential right to earn a living.  Unencumbered 
without a home or a job, a convicted sex offender is more at risk to re-
offend.95  After all, what else has he got to do? 
C.  Not Banishment? 
The impetus for these not-in-my-backyard ordinances and laws is 
the perceived need to keep children away from sex offenders.  After all, 
would any person, if given the choice, want a sex offender living next 
door?  Once one community sets up such a law driving the sex offenders 
out of its community, it forces the neighboring community to act in kind 
to avoid becoming a haven for sex offenders.96  When a community or 
state adopts a 1,000-foot rule or greater, that community is effectively 
removing that individual from its community by its strategic zoning.  By 
looking at a map with the 1,000-foot radius drawn around every school, 
few areas remain where sex offenders may live.97  When daycare 
facilities, including residential homes that serve as day care facilities are 
added in, the possible living area is even smaller.  For states like 
Georgia, which also add in places where children might congregate, all 
school bus stops, and churches, then the map is completely covered.98 
Banishment, not protection, is the desired goal of these laws.99  
Georgia House Majority leader Jerry Keen, the chief sponsor of 2006 
Georgia House Bill 1059, stated, 
We want those people running away from Georgia.  Given the toughest 
laws here, we think a lot of people could move to another state.  If it 
becomes too onerous and too inconvenient, they just may want to live 
 
 93. CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TIME TO WORK: MANAGING 
THE EMPLOYMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS UNDER COMMUNITY SUPERVISION (2002). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Mike Carlson, Not In My City, ORLANDO WEEKLY, Aug. 25, 2005, available at 
http://www.orlandoweekly.com/util/printready.asp?id=8250. 
 97. See infra app. 1. 
 98. GA. CODE ANN § 42-1-15 (2006). 
 99. Jason Garcia, Legislator Seeks Statewide Predator Law, SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 15, 2005, at 
12B (quoting Rep. Susan Goldstein who introduced a bill in the Florida legislature to increase the 
residence restrictions from 1000 feet to 2500 and whose ultimate goal was to “get these people out 
of our neighborhoods and hopefully out of our state”). 
17
Lester: Sex Offender Residence and Employment Restrictions
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
LESTERFINAL.DOC 3/30/2007  1:54:06 PM 
356 AKRON LAW REVIEW [40:339 
somewhere else.  And I don’t care where, as long as it’s not 
Georgia.100   
 The effect of this law in Georgia would be to send sex offenders 
scrambling to find housing and employment, regardless of how long 
they have lived in their current residence. That is the intent.  Rep. Keen 
echoed his sentiments in the house chambers when he said,  
If someone did something now to my grandchildren, I think you and I 
would have the same reaction to that.  Those are the people we’re 
targeting.  Those are the people we are trying to get off the streets of 
this state, and those are the people that we are going to send a message 
to that if you have a propensity to that crime perhaps you need to move 
to another state.101  
 If the law stands, Rep. Keen would get his wish.  In Forsyth 
County, Georgia, 64 of 68 registered sex offenders would have to 
move—most likely out of the county.102  But the situation is even worse 
in neighboring counties.  For instance, in DeKalb County, Georgia, a 
suburb of Atlanta, 466 of the 466 registered sex offenders would have to 
move.103  Pushed out of the urban areas, those affected are forced into 
the country or out of the state. 
The real impetus of these bills is not on protecting children, but on 
punishing former sex offenders once again.104  In response to criticism of 
the residence restrictions in Kentucky, Kenton County Sheriff Chuck 
Korzenborn stated, “I don’t care how inconvenient we make it for these 
guys. . . . Don’t commit the crime and you won’t have to do the time.”105  
These zoning laws are so onerous to comply with that it is just a matter 
 
 100. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 56. 
 101. See Statement by Representative Keen to Representative Roger Bruce during House 
Debate on H.B. 1059, Feb. 2, 2006, House Internet Broadcasts, available at 
http://www.georgia.gov/00/article/0,2086,4802_6107103_47120020,00.html.  See also Georgia’s 
New Sex Offender Law Nixed, GWINNETT DAILY ONLINE, July 3, 2006, available at 
http://www.gwinnettdailyonline.com/GDP/archive/article19EE2C8F45E54F0C972E0BAE97E39C8
6.asp (quoting Representative Keen’s remarks that the law would be an “inconvenience,” but urging 
that “most folks would agree this is a good thing”).   
 102. Doug Nurse, Registered Sex Offenders, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 6, 2006, at 1JH, 
available at 2006 WLNR 11637530. 
 103. Id.  Other metro Atlanta counties would have similar totals: Cherokee County 90 of 95; 
Clayton County 190 of 220; Cobb County 204 of 208; Henry County 100 of 108; and Rockdale 29 
of 29.  Id. 
 104. Joyce Blay, Police Waiting for Maps to Enforce Residency Law: Jackson, Lakewood 
Officials have Targeted Convicted Sex Offenders, TRI-TOWN NEWS, Sept. 22, 2005, available at 
http://tritown.gmnews.com/news/2005/0922/Front_page/032.html. 
 105. William Croyle, Sex Offenders Put on Notice: Move if You’re near a School, CINCINNATI 
ENQUIRER, June 25, 2006, at 1A. 
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of time before innocent people are locked up.  Take the situation in the 
New Jersey townships of Jackson and Lakewood, where, four months 
after adopting sex offender residency ordinances, the townships still had 
not produced maps showing the “pedophile-free zones.”106  “There will 
be a map generated, not so someone can say, ‘Oh, that’s not where I can 
live,’” said a Jackson police captain.107  “It’s not a question of them 
knowing, but so we can know.  If we want to charge them with the 
ordinance, we need the map.”108 
If the real purpose was protection, then states that have adopted 
these programs would offer proof that this community purging actually 
does protect the community and its children.  In fact, the states that have 
actually given thoughtful consideration to this proposal before voting on 
it have found that there is no correlation between residency and 
employment locale and recidivism.  Both Colorado and Minnesota did 
extensive research on the issue and found that, if anything, this forced 
exile only exacerbates the problem it purports to solve.109 
This forced migration of a select group of former criminals is 
unprecedented.  There were forced migrations of Indian Tribes in the 
1830s110 and of Japanese-Americans in the 1940s.111  There have been 
times when suspect groups of people, such as foreign agents, 
Communists, and aliens were subject to monitoring and regulation.112  It 
is rare for a law to force one class of individuals away from the general 
 
 106. Blay, supra note 104. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. (emphasis added). 
 109. See SEX OFFENDER MGMT BD., COLORADO DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, REPORT ON 
SAFETY ISSUES RAISED BY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND LOCATIONS OF SEX OFFENDERS IN 
THE COMMUNITY (2004) (finding no correlation between where sex offenders lived in comparison 
to where other criminals lived therefore, a residence restriction would not be a productive method to 
control recidivism) available at 
http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/Sex_Offender/SO_Pdfs/FullSLAFinal01.pdf; MINNESOTA DEP’T OF 
CORRECTIONS, LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT ISSUES (2003) (finding 
that the residence restrictions would force the state to provide housing for those displaced by such 
an act and that the cost of creating new housing would be too high along with a belief that 
residential restrictions would not enhance community safety)  available at 
http://www.corr.state.mn.us/publications/legislativereports/pdf/2004/Lvl%203%20SEX%20OFFEN
DERS%20report%202003%20(revised%202-04).pdf. 
 110. Pursuant to the Indian Removal Act.  See About North Georgia, The Trail of Tears, 
http://ngeorgia.com/history/nghisttt.html (last visited March 8, 2007). 
 111. Act of March 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (providing a penalty for violation of 
Executive Order 9066, which authorized the Secretary of War to prescribe military areas).  See also 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 112. Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, 
Liberty Depravation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 
90 NW. U. L REV. 788, 815 n.183 (1996). 
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population as if they were contagious.113  It is outrageous for any court 
to mischaracterize laws that require citizens living in a law-abiding 
manner to quit their jobs and uproot their families, taking them out of 
their chosen communities and forcing them into underdeveloped areas 
by not calling it what it is—banishment. 
V. PENALTIES FOR BEING IN THE ZONE 
Violations of the residence or employment restrictions are much 
more than just a slap on the wrist.  For most states the first violation is a 
felony.114  In Alabama and Georgia, it is a severe felony with up to 30 
years for one violation.115  In many cases a violation of this prohibition 
is punished with greater severity than the crime that made the person a 
sexual offender to begin with.116 
Interestingly, for the most part there is no mens rea required to 
violate these restrictions.117  A sexual offender may be strictly liable for 
complying with these prohibitions.118  The basic problem with this is the 
fact that the prohibited areas are growing constantly.  An individual may 
live or work outside a protected zone only to have a daycare facility pop 
up near the sex offender.  In such a case, the sex offender would have 
little recourse and no knowledge of such an event. 
What is really going on is that these regulations are a way to punish 
sex offenders twice for one criminal act.  Feeling unsatisfied and 
impotent, states and local communities set legal traps for the convicted 
sex offenders to fall into so that they can incarcerate them again.  It is 
just a matter of time before a sex offender who tries to remain in a 
community will violate these specially crafted restrictions. 
VI. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
There are unintended consequences of the residence and 
employment restrictions that may actually exacerbate the problem that 
 
 113. In an effort to curb prostitution, Richmond, Virginia, city officials want to make parts of 
the city off limits to particular individuals unless they lived, worked, or worshipped in the area.  Jim 
Nolan, Zones Would Bar Prostitutes, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept.11, 2006, at B-1. 
 114. See infra Table 2. (listing Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and 
Tennessee as the states where the first violation of a restriction is a felony). 
 115. See infra Table 2 (listing that in Alabama, punishment ranges from 1 to 10 years 
imprisonment; in Georgia, from 10 to 30 years imprisonment). 
 116. See infra Table 2. 
 117. See infra Table 2. 
 118. Offenders are strictly liable in Iowa, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Missouri, Ohio, and South Dakota.  See infra Table 2. 
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the laws were intended to correct.  Because these laws are often passed 
without much consideration as to the results of implementation, there 
have been many negatives consequences.  The shortsightedness of these 
laws is that, in their zeal to protect, they give sex offenders little hope of 
redemption. 
We express a desire for rehabilitation of the individual, while 
simultaneously we do everything to prevent it. . . . We tell him to 
return to the norm of behavior, yet we brand him as virtually 
unemployable; he is required to live with his normal activities severely 
restricted and we react with sickened wonder and disgust when he 
returns to a life of crime.119 
Coupled with the fact that these restrictions will not work, the negatives 
far exceed the positives.  That is why the Iowa County Attorney’s 
Association has publicly called for the overturning of Iowa’s 2,000 foot 
residence restriction.120 
By pushing sex offenders away from society, these laws can isolate 
sex offenders from their friends, co-workers, and other support systems.  
Without support, the sex offender is left to fend off any deviant urges on 
his or her own.  Without employment, a sex offender will face idle time, 
which is a factor in favor of recidivism.121 Social science research 
indicates that “[d]uring the past 20 years, research on recidivism of the 
general criminal population identified a history of unstable employment 
as one of the factors that consistently is associated with criminal 
behavior.”122  As Kathleen Colebank, a supervisor for Kentucky’s sex 
offender treatment program states, “With many of the people we treat, 
isolation played a role in them committing the offense, and we risk 
replicating that.”123 
In areas where residence restrictions exist, there are limited choices 
for housing for those classified as sex offenders.  As a result, the 
likelihood exists that sex offenders will be concentrated in certain areas 
of town or certain areas just outside of town, if they can find any 
reasonable housing at all.124  The market value of a neighborhood full of 
 
 119. Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 953 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (Lay, J., dissenting). 
 120. IOWA COUNTY ATTORNEYS ASS’N, STATEMENT ON SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY 
RESTRICTIONS IN IOWA, Feb.14, 2006, available at http://www.iowa-
icaa.com/ICAA%20STATEMENTS/Sex%20Offender%20Residency%20Statement%20Feb%2014
%2006%20for%20website.pdf. 
 121. CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 1-2. 
 122. Id. (citing Paul Gendreau, et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Criminal 
Recidivism: What Works, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575 (1996)). 
 123. Croyle, supra note 105. 
 124. See, e.g., Map of Webster City, Iowa, infra app. 1. 
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registered sex offenders would most likely be depressed, much like an 
area of town deemed to be a “high crime area.”125  Communities would 
then react against any concentration of sex offenders.  For example, the 
small town of Ely, Iowa, a town without a single school or daycare 
center, passed local ordinances banning sex offenders from living near 
the city park, playground, or library, which effectively eliminated all 
residential areas in the town.126  “We felt a little vulnerable,” said an Ely 
resident.127 “For a lot of towns like ours, we can become the only place 
available for sex offenders.”128  Fear, then, is the driving force. 
Residence restrictions leave many offenders homeless.129  The 
coverage area is so large, especially in 2,000-feet areas, that there is 
limited housing available.130  In states or communities where multiple 
difficult-to-identify triggers exist, such as daycare facilities, school bus 
stops or places where children congregate, even a smaller prohibited 
area severely limits reasonable housing.  Much of the permissible 
property is located in high-rent districts or in rural areas where housing 
is limited.131 
The homeless problem creates an enforcement problem.  Although 
offenders are required to provide a valid address when they register, it is 
not uncommon for an offender to have to move to comply with the 
residence law.  Subsequent reporting is poor.132  In Iowa, for example, 
the number of missing sex offenders has more than doubled since the 
residence restrictions went into effect in September 2005.133  Keeping up 
with the migration of sex offenders will be a full-time job for law 
enforcement.134  Most do not have the money or the manpower to devote 
so much time to herding people out of town.  Other states are losing 
track of their registered sex offenders, as well.  Sex offenders simply do 
not bother to register anymore because it will only lead to an immediate 
arrest.  In North Carolina, sex offenders are now missing in record 
 
 125. See, e.g.,  MINNESOTA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 109, at 11. 
 126. Todd Dvorak, Iowa Towns Rush to Bar Sex Offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, November 12, 
2005, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/11/12/ 
iowa_towns_rush_to_bar_sex_offenders/. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See, e.g., Rood, supra note 6. 
 130. See, e.g., MINNESOTA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 109, at 11. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Rood, supra note 6. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Stephen Gurr, Forsyth Sheriff Paxton Testifies in Federal Hearing. FORSYTH COUNTY 
NEWS, July 12, 2006 (quoting Charlene Giles, an investigator for the Houston County (Georgia) 
Sheriff’s Office, “It’s going to be a never-ending job, never-ending”). 
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numbers.135 
Another unintended consequence would be the desire to create 
illegitimate sanctuaries.  Local communities would actively increase the 
number of protected areas by increasing the number of public parks or 
lowering standards for residential daycare facilities.  In some states, it is 
fairly easy to have one’s home considered a child-care facility, which 
would entitle it to the protection zone.  In Iowa, for instance, as the 
number of day care facilities increases, it becomes more and more 
difficult to know what locations are off-limits.136  While there is nothing 
inherently wrong with having a surplus of daycare facilities, the 
classification of many would be disingenuous.  Similarly, in states that 
include school bus stops as a prohibited area, there would be impetus for 
communities to artificially designate areas to zone off more of the 
community.137 
Another enforcement problem is created by treating all sex 
offenders the same regardless of the nature of their offense.  By treating 
all sex offenders the same, the number of individuals classified as a sex 
offender becomes too large to effectively manage.  The number of sex 
offenders will grow at a pace much faster than the authorities can 
handle.  Special units will need to be created that focus on the 
monitoring of sex offenders.  State and local governments, already 
strapped for funds, are not equipped to handle all the work required by 
these restrictive ordinances. 
These restrictions displace not only individuals, but also their 
families.138  The impact of relocating is not just felt by the offender 
because the whole family unit must move.  A family may have to find 
new friends, attend new schools, and find new places to worship.  Some 
 
 135. Fred Kelly & Franco Ordoñez, Gaps in Sex-Offender Tracking, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, 
Jun. 11, 2006, 1A (“Authorities have lost track of at least 22 convicted sex offenders in 
Mecklenburg County and hundreds more across the Carolinas.”). 
 136. According to the Iowa Department of Human Resources between 2002 and 2003, the first 
year of the residence restrictions, there were 1,921 new listings on the list of 7,172 facilities 
statewide.  Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 849 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev’d, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 
2005).  See also WOI-TV, supra note 89. 
 137. Press Release, Southern Center for Human Rights, Enforcement of Bus Stop Rule Halted 
in Bulloch County (Aug. 15, 2006) (stating that the consent order agreed to after Bulloch County 
Georgia school boards designated 1,700 school bus stops in Bulloch county), available at 
http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059_litigation/PressReleases/press_lawsuitH
B1059_BullochConsent.htm. 
 138. Georgia School Districts Embroiled in Enforcement of Sex Offender Law, National 
School Boards Association, Legal Clips, Aug. 2006, available at 
http://www.nsba.org/site/doc_cosa.asp?TRACKID=&VID=50&CID=482&DID=38984 
[hereinafter Georgia School Districts] (40 families will be displaced once the Columbia County, 
Georgia, establishes where bus stops are officially located). 
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families are faced with a difficult decision; because of the reduction in 
the quality of life in staying together, some may choose to remain 
without the offending family member. 
Finally, by establishing these residence and employment 
restrictions, a community is merely passing its perceived problem on to 
the next town.139  One by one, communities are adopting laws—not to 
handle a perceived current problem with local sex offenders—but as a 
defense mechanism to prevent displaced offenders from other areas from 
settling in their community.140  In Orange Beach Alabama, residents not 
satisfied with the Alabama’s 2000 foot restriction passed an ordinance 
that increases the prohibited zones to four miles.141  As community after 
community forbids offenders from residing in their midst, sex offenders 
are left to wander the earth in search of acceptance. 
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THESE RESTRICTIONS 
With the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Doe v. Miller, 
the Court currently tacitly permits residence and employment 
restrictions.142  The key aspect in determining the constitutionality of 
these restrictions lies in whether the Court views these restrictions as 
civil or criminal.  The Court in Smith v. Doe upheld the sex offender 
registrations as civil and regulatory because they did not prohibit the sex 
offender from doing anything; rather, the regulations merely required 
sex offenders to do something that is not uncommon.143  Under the 
Alaska statutory scheme, sex offenders just had to register themselves, 
much like any other person would register a motor vehicle.144  If a 
vehicle is moved from one jurisdiction to another, the owner is required 
to update that registration.  Having to register as a sex offender does not 
prevent a sex offender from moving.145  Surprisingly, most courts that 
have had an opportunity to weigh in on this issue have upheld residence 
and employment restrictions as constitutional.146  The U.S. Supreme 
 
 139. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 96. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Ryan Dezember, City Tightens Sex Abuser Restrictions, MOBILE REG., Sept. 8, 2005, at 3. 
 142. Doe v. Miller, 126 S.Ct. 757 (2005), denying cert. to 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 143. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96, 106 (2003) (holding Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration 
Act was not unconstitutional and not violative of the ex post facto clause). 
 144. Id. at 96. 
 145. Sex offenders often cannot move without first obtaining permission from both the local 
law enforcement and the proposed new law enforcement.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.21(6)(i-j) 
(2006). 
 146. See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005); Denson v. Georgia, 600 S.E.2d 645 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (holding residence restrictions were not unconstitutional ex post facto law as 
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Court has not fully examined the constitutionality of residence and 
employment restrictions but does suggest that there are limits to the 
restrictions placed on sex offenders who have served their time.147 
A. Ex Post Facto Laws 
In general, ex post facto laws are laws passed after a particular 
event has occurred to make the previous activity illegal.148  A prohibition 
against ex post facto laws is found in the United States Constitution149 
and serves as a foundational principle for our ordered scheme of 
liberty.150  The United States Constitution also prohibits states from 
enacting such laws.151  Ex post facto laws are often considered void.152 
In its first Ex Post Facto Clause case, the Supreme Court described 
four ways a legislature could run afoul of it.153  Justice Chase wrote: 
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of 
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and 
punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or 
makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law 
that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, 
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every 
law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the 
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. All 
these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive.154 
“[B]ut the restriction not to pass any ex post facto law, was to 
secure the person of the subject from injury, or punishment, in 
consequence of such law.”155 
For a law to be ex post facto, it must also “disadvantage the 
 
applied to plaintiff); Illinois v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 2005) (holding residence 
restriction not unconstitutional); Iowa v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005). 
 147. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100. 
 148. See, e.g., id. at 92; Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1997); Weaver v. Graham, 
450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937); Rooney v. North 
Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1905); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890); Calder v. Bull, 3 
U.S. 386, 390, (1798).  See also Logan, supra note 5. 
 149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 150. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000). 
 151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 152. See generally 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 584 (2006). 
 153. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. 
 154. Id. at 390-91. 
 155. Id. at 390. 
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offender affected by it.”156 There is no requirement that it hinder any 
particular right.  In fact, “[it] need not impair a ‘vested right’ . . . . Even 
if a statute merely alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the 
legislature, it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it is both retrospective 
and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense.”157  
For example, a change in state law that altered how “good time credit” 
was calculated for inmates was an ex post facto violation even though 
there is no constitutional right to “good time credit.”158 
Determining if a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause hinges on 
the purpose of the law.159  If the legislature meant to impose punishment, 
then the statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it punishes previous 
activity.160  If the intention was to establish “civil proceedings” by 
enacting a regulatory scheme that is civil and non-punitive, then the 
court must look at the effect of the law.161 
The first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislative intent.162  
Courts give the legislature the benefit of the doubt in determining intent, 
especially if there is an explicitly stated intent within the statute.163  A 
high standard of proof is required to overcome even a superficial 
statement of intent.164  The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed in Smith, 
“only the clearest proof will suffice to override that intent and transform 
what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”165 
Various courts have taken great pains to find a civil intent.  For instance, 
the placement and naming of an act is given more weight if it claims to 
be civil and is found in the civil code.166  The lack of any identification 
or its placement in the criminal code is often treated as having little 
probative value.167  Regardless of the label or placement of a restriction, 
the inquiry does not end at this point. 
In examining the legislative intent, it is important to see the lengths 
 
 156. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 
401 (1937)). 
 157. Id. at 29-31. 
 158. See id. 
 159. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). 
 160. Id.; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). If the statute’s intent is to punish, 
then the Ex Post Facto Clause will be violated if the now unlawful act occurred prior to the adoption 
of the law.  See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
 161. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
 162. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  See also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). 
 166. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249. 
 167. Smith, 538 U.S. at 94-95. 
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the legislature went in analyzing the alleged problem.  The courts must 
be sensitive to the fact that there may not be legitimate debate and 
discussion on sex offender restrictions because of the lack of real 
representation by the effected class: convicted sex offenders.168  The few 
states that have taken the time to see if residence or employment 
restrictions would actually work did not enact such provisions.169  Most 
legislative bodies act in haste with one goal in mind: removing sex 
offenders from the community.170  The Supreme Court has said that the 
“failure to consider, or to use, ‘alternative and less harsh methods’ to 
achieve a non-punitive objective can help to show that legislature’s 
‘purpose was to punish.’”171 
Next a court must look at the practical effects of the restrictions and 
decide if these restrictions are regulatory or punitive.172  A hardship 
placed on an individual is not enough to make a restriction punitive.  For 
instance, just because a restriction might cause the community to distrust 
a sex offender, it will not be punitive unless it encourages an act of 
retribution against the sex offender.173 As a result, sex offender 
registrations are not considered punitive,174 nor is civil commitment for 
sexually violent predators.175 
The Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez set forth seven factors 
to assist in determining if a statute’s restrictions constitute actual 
punishment.176  These factors are not exhaustive but are helpful.177  The 
court will balance the factors, which at times contradict each other.  
They include: whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint; whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; 
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; whether its 
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment: retribution 
 
 168. There is a disenfranchisement issue that should provide courts with a reason to view 
skeptically any facial designation of civil as opposed to criminal. 
 169. Colorado and Minnesota both passed on the issue after extensive studies.  See supra note 
109 and accompanying text. 
 170. See, e.g., Georgia School Districts, supra note 138 (quoting school superintendent 
Tommy Price, who stated, “Our board didn’t give a lot of thought one way or the other . . . We saw 
no reason why we shouldn’t formally approve them.”).   
 171. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 388 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)). 
 172. See Hawker v. People of New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898).  A court will look at the 
substance of the law and not at its form in determining whether it is ex post facto.  Id. 
 173. See Patterson v. State, 985 P.2d 1007, 1013 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999), overruled on other 
grounds by Doe v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 92 P.3d 398 (Alaska 2004). 
 174. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003). 
 175. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369. 
 176. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). 
 177. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. 
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and deterrence; whether the behavior to which it applies is already a 
crime; whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it; and whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.178 
The civil/criminal analysis under Mendoza-Martinez tends to be 
result oriented.  Because there is no true test or measuring stick to 
distinguish the two, courts seem to weigh the factors according to the 
preferred outcome.  How else could the court construe confinement for 
those considered dangerous to be civil and not criminal, preventive and 
not punitive, when the result of the restraints are exactly the same?179  
As residence and employment restrictions proliferate, courts should 
eventually reach the point at which these restrictions are considered 
punitive and not regulatory.180 
There are several important factual differences that distinguish 
residence and employment restrictions from the two previous sanctions 
which were deemed regulatory: sex offender registration and civil 
commitment.  Residence and employment restrictions place an 
affirmative burden on several fundamental liberty interests—where to 
live, work, raise a family, and even travel.  The freedom to live a law-
abiding life in the manner of one’s own choosing should not be 
terminated by a criminal conviction.  More importantly, it should not be 
a result of conviction.  Unlike registration requirements, these 
restrictions are a new and unexpected restraint on sex offenders’ lives.181 
The ramification of not being able to live and work where you choose is 
not a product of the crime; it is a product of the legislation. 
Residence and employment restrictions are not like registration 
requirements because residence and employment restrictions actually 
impose a physical restraint on the sex offender.  The Court in Smith v. 
Doe found that Alaska’s registration law was not punitive because “the 
Act imposes no physical restraint, and so does not resemble the 
punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative 
 
 178. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69. 
 179. See Michael Louis Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants and Preventive 
Detention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2005); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the 
Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L. J. 1 (2005); Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil 
Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679 (1999); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of 
Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 180. See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 849 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev’d, 405 F.3d 700 
(8th Cir. 2005). 
 181. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101.  “Although the public availability of the information may have a 
lasting and painful impact on the convicted sex offender, these consequences flow not from the 
Act’s registration and dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already a matter of 
public record.” Id. 
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disability of restraint.”182  The Court even goes on to say that “the Act 
does not restrain activities sex offenders may pursue but leaves them 
free to change jobs or residences.”183  Thus, the Smith Court implies that 
a residence or employment restriction might be improper. 
The Smith Court does note that particular employment prohibitions 
can be legitimate civil sanctions.184  For example, the Court has 
authorized the forbidding participation in the banking industry,185 
working as a union official186 or revocation of a medical license.187  But 
these restrictions are case specific and are related to the underlying 
deviant behavior that resulted in such a sanction.  Restrictions that 
prohibit working within a certain distance of a school or church have no 
particular correlation to the previous employment of the sex offender or 
the relationship, if any, of the employment to the criminal offense. 
These restrictions are an inverted detention.  In prison, offenders 
are confined to a small space while society continues around it.  Under 
these residence and employment schemes, the walls are built around 
society and the offender is forced to live confined outside them.188  
Essentially, towns become gated communities with severe punishments 
for trespassers.  The issue boils down to the greater of two motives. Do 
these invisible walls protect society, punish the offender, or both?  If the 
objective is to incapacitate the sex offenders so that they cannot re-
offend, then that is a form of punishment.189 
Unlike civil commitment, which provides some effort at 
rehabilitation through counseling and psychological treatment, residence 
and employment restrictions confer no benefit on the sex offender.190 
 
 182. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997). 
 186. See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960). 
 187. See Hawker v. People of New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
 188. See Wayne A. Logan, A Study in “Actuarial Justice”: Sex Offender Classification 
Practice and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593, 595-96 (2000) (“To a significant extent, the 
laws serve ‘a kind of waste management function,’ a massive corrections experiment taking place 
beyond prison walls.”). 
 189. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *11-*12 (stating an objective of criminal law 
is to “depriv[e] the party injuring of the power to do future mischief.”).  See also United States v. 
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (“Punishment serves several purposes: retribution, rehabilitation, 
deterrent – and preventative.  One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to 
keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less 
punishment.”).  See also HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 3-6 (1968). 
 190. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986).  See also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 
381 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer, in his dissent, suggests that withholding or 
delaying treatment until the end or near the end of the prison sentence, so that further detention is 
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These restrictions are for the protection of the public by removing these 
“dangerous” individuals.  There is no evidence that these restrictions 
will cure a sex offender of his or her deviant actions.  In his dissent in 
Hendricks, Justice Breyer states, “The Allen Court’s focus upon 
treatment, as a kind of touchstone helping to distinguish civil from 
punitive purposes, is not surprising, for one would expect a non-punitive 
statutory scheme to confine, not simply in order to protect, but also in 
order to cure.”191  There needs to be some benefit to all interested 
parties: the state and the convicted offender.  Protecting society alone is 
not enough, especially since there is no proof that these restrictions will 
protect society. 
Most of the residence and employment zoning restrictions apply 
only to a special class of individuals: those who have previously 
committed a sexual offense.192  The civil commitment contemplated in 
Hendricks involved offenders who had also been adjudged to be 
dangerous.193  The Supreme Court has found that an imposition of 
restrictive measures on sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous is a 
legitimate non-punitive governmental objective.194  What is often 
missing from sex offender residence and employment restrictions is a 
finding of dangerousness with the individual offenders.  The legislative 
trend is for residence restrictions to apply to all who are required to 
register, with no finding of dangerousness.195  For example, Arkansas 
and Louisiana apply these restrictions only on those found to be sexually 
violent predators.196  This overbroad classification does not take into 
account the life situation of its victims and creates unjustified havoc.  
For example, an 80-year-old Lexington, Kentucky, resident “living 
in . . . a nursing home, where he is treated for dementia and heart 
ailments,” will have to move to the nearest nursing home facility that 
satisfies Kentucky’s new harsher residence restrictions—two hours 
 
required, is a scheme that looks punitive. Id. 
 191. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 192. Id. at 380 (citing Dept. of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 781 (1994) 
(finding that a tax on marijuana [is] “conditioned on the commission of a crime . . . is ‘significant of 
[its] penal and prohibitory intent’”)). 
 193. Id. at 363 (majority opinion). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Six (Michigan, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, South Dakota, and Kentucky) of the Seven 
(Virginia) states that created new post-sentence residence restrictions in 2006 were registration 
driven.  Three (Georgia, Oklahoma, Tennessee) of the four (Missouri) additional states that 
amended their previous laws to increase the restrictions in 2006 were also registration driven. See 
Table 1. 
 196. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (2006). 
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away.197  These restrictions treat all sex offenders the same regardless if 
the offense was a misdemeanor or felony, a first or subsequent offense, a 
predatory act or temporary lapse in judgment.  The desire of these 
restrictions is to keep the handful of truly deviant predators away from 
children, but its application is overbearing and punitive on the vast 
majority of sex offenders. 
Finally, violation of a true regulatory scheme results in a fine or 
injunction but certainly does not carry a possible thirty-year prison 
term.198  Thirty years is a significant criminal sanction available for only 
the most heinous crimes.  With these laws in effect, those classified as 
sex offenders live their lives in fear that they may inadvertently, and 
with no malicious intent, violate these laws and basically throw away the 
rest of their lives.199  These restrictions are significant restraints equal to 
and perhaps even greater than the punishment received for the 
underlying offense.200  There is a severe impact on those who have 
served their time but languish under the status of being a sex offender.  
Individuals who have paid their debt are now required to pay more.  
Subsequent punishments are clear violations of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. 
B. Other Constitutional Claims 
There is no more fundamental American right than the right to own 
property and earn a livelihood.201  That right is guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, which require due process before these 
interests can be taken away.  The tension is between a state’s alleged 
exercise of its police power in the interest of the general welfare and the 
process by which individuals lose their individual liberty.  A state’s 
police power does not give it unlimited power over individual liberty.  
 
 197. Andrew Wolfson, Sex Offenders Fight Residence Rules, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Sept. 
21, 2006. 
 198. Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(d) (2006). 
 199. See infra Table 2 (listing mental element requirements for each state). 
 200. See infra Table 2 (listing punishments for first and subsequent violations). 
 201. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).   
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, 
the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been 
definitely stated.  Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but 
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations 
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to 
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy 
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.  
Id. 
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As Justice Harlan stated, “the police power cannot be put forward as an 
excuse for oppressive and unjust legislation.”202 When a state is 
exercising its police power there must be a balance between the public 
and private interests involved in order for the regulations to be 
reasonable.203 
Sex offender residence and employment restrictions may violate 
other constitutional provisions, but analysis of those claims is typically 
hindered by the predicate determination that the restrictions are are civil 
in nature.  For instance, if a court finds the proceedings and actions civil 
in nature, then the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
does not attach.204  Similarly, if the court refuses to call sanctions 
punishment, then the constitutional scrutiny is greatly diminished.205 
A finding that a law is civil in nature effectively thwarts most 
constitutional claims.  Likewise, a determination that the restrictions are 
actually punishment will result in multiple constitutional violations.  
Regardless of the number of constitutional deficiencies, a court need 
only find one constitutional violation to make an act unconstitutional. 
Other constitutional claims are available, but will not be discussed 
in this article. They include the following: violation of substantive due 
process rights under the 14th Amendment by restricting the right to own 
a home in location of one’s own choosing,206 violation of the right to 
work207 and the right to travel;208 violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment by treating sex offenders differently than 
all other citizens;209 violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment;210 violation of the Double Jeopardy 
 
 202. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 66 (1905) (dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan), 
overruled by Day-Bright Lighting Inc. V. Missouri, 342 U.S. 45 (1952). 
 203. Dept. of Transp. v. Longo, 510 A.2d 832, 834 (Pa. 1986). 
 204. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1986). 
 205. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (finding that deportation is not punishment 
and therefore not contrary to the Ex Post Facto Clause). 
 206. See Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974).  Zoning ordinances that have the effect 
of restricting the number of unrelated persons who may live together in a residential zone are not 
violative of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection.  So long as the zoning ordinance bears a 
rational relationship to a permissible state objective, it is constitutional.  Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (holding that a housing ordinance limiting occupancy of a 
dwelling unit to a narrow definition of “family” violated Due Process). 
 207. See e.g. Wilson v. Loew’s Inc., 355 U.S. 597, 599 (1958). There is a “fundamental right to 
work.”  Id. 
 208. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).  See also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 
489, 498 (1999). 
 209. See e.g. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (2006) 
(treating people differently for no lawful purpose violates equal protection). 
 210. These restrictions are often disproportionate to the crime in degree and scope as to make 
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Clause;211 and violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.212 
VIII. THE COURT DOES HAVE ITS BREAKING POINT 
Even though most of the previous case law has sanctified sex 
offender residence and employment restrictions, there does seem to be a 
point where the U.S. Supreme Court will say enough is enough.  In his 
dissent in Hendricks, Justice Kennedy warns that activities such as civil 
commitment for sex offenders would cross the line if “[it] were to 
become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, or if it were 
shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a 
solid basis for concluding that civil commitment is justified, our 
precedents would not suffice to validate it.”213  Perhaps it will start with 
a willingness to take down a statute that is imprecise in its understanding 
and application, such as in Georgia.214  In July 2006, the addition of 
school bus stops to the list of places a sex offender cannot live or work 
within 1,000 feet was deemed too imprecise because there was no formal 
declaration of a school bus stop.215  Or perhaps the Court will conclude 
that the classification of sex offenders is too large to precisely indicate 
future dangerousness.  As legislative bodies continue to push sex 
offenders out by adding prohibited places or enlarging the zones around 
 
them unconstitutional.  A person convicted of a misdemeanor expects to receive a punishment that 
last less than a year.  Likewise a person convicted of a felony expects that the maximum amount of 
time his liberty would be restricted would be the statutorily established sentencing limits.  It was 
never contemplated that a misdemeanor conviction would, some ten years after the final disposition, 
create a new debilitating restraint on his or her liberty.  It is cruel and unusual punishment for a 
strict liability crime to carry a severe sanction such as a prison sentence of 10 or more years.  It is 
fundamentally unfair to imprison someone for a technical violation when there is no evil intent. 
Scholars have noted a shift in public opinion regarding strict liability crimes.  See Catherine L. 
Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. 
REV. 313, 380 (2003); Carol. S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the 
Criminal-Civil Divide, 85 GEO. L. 775 (1997).  Yet that is precisely what the residence and 
employment restrictions do. 
 211. A new restraint on liberty after being released from prison should be considered a second 
punishment for the same criminal action. See e.g. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 101-
02 (1997). 
 212. Every state has some form of registration for sex offenders.  Variations exist on the 
frequency and the amount of information required depending on the state and the level/classification 
of the offender.  All registrations require that the offender provide a current residence.  It is possible 
that in the process of following the law and registering as a sex offender, that an individual may be 
unknowingly incriminating himself if the address listed is within a prohibited area. 
 213. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 214. See, e.g. Jill Young Miller, Sex Offender Law Muddled, ATLANTA J.-CONSTITUTION, July 
26, 2006, at A1, A9. 
 215. Id. 
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the prohibited places and as the punitive intent of these laws becomes 
even more evident, reason will win out over passion. 
IX. A BETTER SOLUTION 
Merely keeping convicted sex offenders away from particular areas 
does nothing to keep them away from children or any other potential 
victims.  A key aspect of most sex offenses is that the assailant and the 
victim often have a relationship with each other before the violation 
occurs.  The stranger danger for sex crimes is actually very low.  
Whatever danger is posed, it is probably best handled by educating 
children how to act.216  And if there is a desire to separate children from 
child sexual offenders, then laws that hinder relationship-building, such 
as prohibiting a child sex offender from working at a daycare or school, 
would be narrowly tailored, less restrictive and more effective. 
A better solution to the problem would be to discontinue the 
practice of exiling the convicted sex offenders from the general 
population once they have paid their debt to society.  If society is so 
certain that sex offenders have not paid enough, then perhaps the 
incarceration time should increase.  At a minimum, some sort of 
rehabilitation and treatment should be used throughout the confinement 
period so that society could better trust that the person leaving the 
penitentiary is changed from the one who entered.  Preventing offenders 
from being able to reasonably assimilate themselves in the general 
population does not serve any legitimate purpose other than making 
politicians feel like they are tough on crime. 
Instead of simply hoping that incarceration for any length of time 
will rehabilitate a sex offender or setting up arbitrary barriers that 
debilitate any hope of assimilation, a more prudent approach would be to 
provide some comprehensive counseling during incarceration, so that 
when sex offenders are released, we can be more hopeful that they will 
not re-offend.  Alternatively, sex offenders could spend the last portion 
of their sentence in a sex offender halfway house, where they could 
receive the counseling and assistance needed to rejoin society and 
overcome any deviant urges.217  It is presumptively unfair to punish 
 
 216. A greater danger for children may come from internet chat-room stalkers.  Some of NBC 
Dateline’s most popular shows involve catching child predators. Residence and Employment 
restrictions would not solve this problem at all.  In fact, by keeping some sex offenders unemployed, 
the restrictions may give chat-room stalkers more time to chat. 
 217. For example in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Alpha Human Services offers an Adult 
Residential Program specifically designed for repeat sexual offenders.  See Alpha Human Services, 
www.alphaservices.org, for more information. 
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someone for the status crime of being a sex offender, rather than for the 
underlying crime.  Giving first-time offenders probation with little or no 
jail time—but then sentencing them to a felony when they fail to move 
from a house they have lived in for the past 10 years without incident—
does not cure any problem.  It is merely a means by which sex offenders 
can be punished a second time for their crime without running afoul of 
any double jeopardy claims. 
If it can be proven that a particular amount of time is necessary to 
rehabilitate, then that amount of time should be the minimum time 
required to be spent by all noteworthy sex offenders.  Releasing 
individuals before they are competent to control their anti-social desires 
and creating a massive system to monitor and track them until the 
inevitable day occurs when they re-offend is not in society’s best 
interest.  Once people serve their full sentences, their debt to society is 
paid.  They now owe society nothing for their past actions—only the 
promise to live debt-free henceforth.  If the current punishment is not 
sufficient, then it must be increased so that society will receive its 
payment upfront, not after the fact.  Residence and employment 
restrictions re-punish those who do not deserve additional punishment.  
That practice is contrary to our ordered scheme of liberty and must 
cease.  The time has come for the courts to protect the interests of this 
helpless group and end this practice. 
There is no arguing the fact that sex crimes are terrible.  But so are 
many different crimes.  Everyone makes mistakes.218  It seems that for 
this broad spectrum of crimes there is a one-strike-and-you’re-out 
policy.  With recidivism so low and the likelihood of repentance high, it 
is a shame that people like Lori Sue Collins are treated as lepers.219  The 
good in her is ignored as she is cast out, away from society, and forced 
into a nomadic existence by a twenty-first century lynch mob.  If there is 
no redemption possible for sex offenders, then why not act accordingly 
and lock them up forever or execute them?  If not, no matter how much 
we hate the sin, we have to reach out to the sinner.  We must offer sex 
offenders real hope, because without hope, they will act without 
conscience; then everyone loses. 
 
 218. “For all have sinned and fall short of the Glory of God.”  Romans 3:23. 
 219. See Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 38-45. 
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TABLE 1 – SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE PROHIBITED 
ZONES 
 
State Residence 
prohibition 
applies to: 
What is the 
prohibited zone? 
 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Alabama Persons convicted 
of a “criminal sex 
offense”220 
Within 2,000 feet 
of any school or 
child care 
facility221 
Life222 No 
Arkansas Persons required 
to register as a 
sex offender 
AND who are 
assigned risk 
level 3 (high) or 4 
(SVP)223 
Within 2,000 feet 
of any elementary 
or secondary 
school or daycare 
facility224 
15 years to 
life225 
Yes226 
Delaware Persons convicted 
of certain sex 
offenses 
involving a child 
under 16227 
Within 500 feet of 
the property of 
any school228 
Life229 No 
 
 220. ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(a), 15-20-21(1) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 221. § 15-20-26(a). 
 222. ALA. CODE § 15-20-33(a) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 223. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006). 
 224. Id. 
 225. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-919(a),(b)(1) (2006). 
 226. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-917(h), 919(b)(1), 922(b)(1)(a) (2006). A sex offender may 
request an administrative review challenging the level 3 or 4 risk assignment, request a risk 
reassessment every five years, and petition a court for release from registration requirements after 
15 years. By lowering the risk classification to level 1 or 2, or obtaining release from registration 
requirements, a sex offender will no longer be subject to the residence restriction. 
 227. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112(b)(4) (2006). 
 228. § 1112(a)(1) (2006). 
 229. Id. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence 
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely.  Id. 
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State Residence 
prohibition 
applies to: 
What is the 
prohibited zone? 
 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Florida Persons convicted 
of certain sex 
offenses 
involving a child 
under 16230 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any school, day 
care center, park, 
or playground231 
Life232 No 
Georgia Persons required 
to register as a 
sex offender233 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any child care 
facility, church, 
school, or area 
where minors 
congregate234 
10 years to 
life235 
 
Yes236 
Idaho Persons required 
to register as a 
sex offender237 
Within 500 feet of 
the property on 
which  a school is 
located238 
10 years to 
life239 
Yes240 
 
 230. FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2006). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence 
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely.  Id. 
 233. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (2006). 
 234. Id. Georgia’s sex offender residency prohibition was amended in 2006 to 1) make it a 
crime to loiter within the prohibited  zone, 2) include “churches” among the restricted areas, and 3) 
add school bus stops and public/community swimming pools to the definition of  “area where 
minors congregate.”  See H.B, 1059, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/versions/hb1059_HB_1059_AP_11.htm. 
 235. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(g) (2006). 
 236. Id. Effective July 1, 2006, sexual offenders may petition a court for release from 
registration requirements after 10 years.  Id.  If successful, the offender will no longer be subject to 
the residence restriction.  Id. 
 237. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329(1) (2006). 
 238. § 18-8329(1)(d). 
 239. § 18-8310(1). 
 240. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition a court for release 
from registration requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be subject to the 
residence restriction.  Id. 
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State Residence 
prohibition 
applies to: 
What is the 
prohibited zone? 
 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Illinois Persons convicted 
of a child sex 
offense, or 
certified as a 
sexually 
dangerous person 
whose victim was 
under 18241 
Within 500 feet of 
any school that 
persons under the 
age of 18 attend242 
Life243 No244  
Indiana Persons required 
to register as a 
sex offender who 
are 1) sexually 
violent predators, 
or 2) have been 
convicted of 
certain offenses 
involving a 
minor245 
Within 1,000 feet 
of school 
property, a youth 
program center, or 
public park246 
10 years to 
life247 
Yes248 
 
 241. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5), (c)(1) (2006). 
 242. Id. § 5/11-9.3(b-5). 
 243. Id. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence 
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely.  Id. 
 244. A “sexually dangerous person” may appeal the designation. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/9 
(2006). But, even if successful, the offender will remain subject to the residence prohibition if 
his/her underlying conviction is a qualifying child sex offense. 
 245. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11(a) (West 2006). 
 246. § 35-42-4-11(c). 
 247. IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-19 (West 2006). 
 248. Id. The duty to register, and consequently the residence restriction, terminates after 10 
years for certain offenders. A sexually violent predator may petition a court to have the SVP status 
removed 10 years after the initial classification. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.5(g) (West 2006). 
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State Residence 
prohibition 
applies to: 
What is the 
prohibited zone? 
 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Iowa Persons who have 
committed a 
criminal, 
aggravated, 
sexually violent, 
or other offense 
involving a 
minor249 
Within 2,000 feet 
of a elementary or 
secondary school 
or child care 
facility250 
Life251 No 
Kentucky Persons required 
to register as a 
sex offender252 
Within 1,000 feet 
of a school, 
preschool, public 
playground, or 
day care facility253 
20 years to 
life254 
Yes255 
Louisiana Sexually violent 
predators256 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any elementary 
or secondary 
school, day care, 
playground, youth 
center, public 
swimming pool, 
or free standing 
video arcade257 
Life258 No259 
 
 249. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(1), (2) (West 2006). 
 250. § 692A.2A(2). 
 251. Id. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence 
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely. 
 252. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545(1) (West 2006). 
 253. Id. 
 254. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.520(2)(a), (3) (West 2006). 
 255. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from 
registration requirements, and consequently the residence restriction, after 20 years.  Id. 
 256. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (2006). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence 
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely.  Id. 
 259. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542.1 (2006) (containing no provision for reconsideration 
of the SVP classification after the sentencing court makes the initial determination). Section 2 of 
Acts 1999, No. 594 repealed paragraph (B)(4) of this section which allowed the defendant to 
petition the sentencing court annually for review of the SVP designation. Id. 
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State Residence 
prohibition 
applies to: 
What is the 
prohibited zone? 
 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Michigan Persons required 
to register as a 
sex offender260 
Within 1,000 feet 
of school 
property261 
10 years to 
life262 
Yes263 
Mississippi Persons required 
to register as a 
sex offender264 
Within 1,500 feet 
of any elementary 
or secondary 
school or child 
care facility265 
10 years to 
life266 
Yes267 
Missouri Persons convicted 
of certain sex 
offenses268 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any school or 
childcare 
facility269 
Life270 No 
Ohio Persons convicted 
of a sexually 
oriented offense 
or child-victim 
oriented 
offense271 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any school 
premises272 
Life273 No 
 
 260. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.735(1) (2006). 
 261. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.735(1), 733(f) (2006). 
 262. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.725(6), (7) (2006). 
 263. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from 
registration requirements, and consequently the residence restriction, after 10 to 25 years.  Id. 
 264. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25(4)(a) (2006). 
 265. Id. 
 266. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-47(2)(a) (2006). 
 267. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition a court for release 
from registration requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be subject to the 
residence restriction.  Id. 
 268. MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147(1) (West 2006). 
 269. Id. 
 270. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence 
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely.  See id. 
 271. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(A) (West 2006). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence 
prohibition, thus the restriction lasts indefinitely.  Id. 
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State Residence 
prohibition 
applies to: 
What is the 
prohibited zone? 
 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Oklahoma Persons registered 
as a sex 
offender274 
Within 2,000 feet 
of any school, 
educational 
institution, park, 
playground, or 
childcare 
facility275 
10 years to 
life276 
Yes277 
South 
Dakota 
Persons required 
to register as a 
sex offender278 
Within 500 feet of 
any school, public 
park, playground, 
or public pool279 
10 years to 
life280 
Yes281 
Tennessee Persons required 
to register as a 
sex offender 
whose victim was 
a minor282 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any school, day 
care/child care 
facility, public 
park, playground, 
recreation center, 
or athletic field283 
10 years to 
life284 
Yes285 
 
 274. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (West 2006). 
 275. Id. 
 276. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 583(C), 584(J) (West 2006). 
 277. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from 
registration requirements, and consequently the residence restriction, after 10 years.  Id. 
 278. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-23 (2006). 
 279. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-24B-23, 22-24B-22(1) (2006). 
 280. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-24B-27 (2006). 
 281. Id. A sex offender may petition a court 10 years after conviction for release from the 
residency restriction.  Id. 
 282. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(a) (2006). 
 283. Id. 
 284. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(a), (f)(1) (2006). 
 285. § 40-39-207(c). Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition the 
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation for release from registration requirements after 10 years, and, if 
successful, will no longer be subject to the residence restriction. 
41
Lester: Sex Offender Residence and Employment Restrictions
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
LESTERFINAL.DOC 3/30/2007  1:54:06 PM 
380 AKRON LAW REVIEW [40:339 
State Residence 
prohibition 
applies to: 
What is the 
prohibited zone? 
 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Virginia Adults convicted 
of certain sex 
offenses where 
the offender is 
more than 3 years 
older than the 
victim286 
Within 500 feet of 
the premises of a 
child day center, 
or primary, 
secondary, or high 
school287 
Life288 No 
 
 
 
 286. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.3(A) (2006). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. The offender “shall be forever prohibited from residing” within the prohibited zone.  
Id. 
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TABLE 2 – PENALTIES FOR RESIDING WITHIN 
PROHIBITED ZONE 
 
State Felony/Misdemeanor Punishment - 
1st Violation 
Punishment -
2nd or 
Subsequent 
Violations 
Mental 
Element 
Alabama Class C felony289 Imprisonment, 
1 to 10 
years290 
Same Knowingly291 
Arkansas Class D felony292 Imprisonment, 
up to 6 
years293 
Same Knowingly294 
Delaware Class G felony295 Imprisonment, 
up to 2 
years296 
Same Strict 
Liability297 
Florida First degree 
misdemeanor or third 
degree felony 
depending on the 
degree of punishment 
for the qualifying sex 
offense298 
Misdemeanor, 
imprisonment 
up to 1 year; 
felony, 
imprisonment 
up to 5 
years299 
Same Strict 
Liability300 
Georgia301 Felony Imprisonment, 
10 to 30 years 
Same Knowingly 
 
 289. ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(h) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 290. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-6(a)(3) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 291. § 15-20-26(h). 
 292. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(d) (2006). 
 293. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(5) (2006). 
 294. § 5-14-128(d). 
 295. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112(a)(1) (2006). 
 296. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(b)(7) (2006). 
 297. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See tit. 11, § 
1112(a)(1). 
 298. FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2006). 
 299. FLA. STAT.  § 775.082(3)(d), (4)(a) (2006). 
 300. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred.  See § 
794.065. 
 301. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(d) (2006). 
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State Felony/Misdemeanor Punishment - 
1st Violation 
Punishment -
2nd or 
Subsequent 
Violations 
Mental 
Element 
Idaho Misdemeanor302 Imprisonment, 
up to 6 
months, fine 
up to $1,000, 
or both303 
Same Strict 
Liability304 
Illinois Class 4 felony305 Imprisonment, 
1 to 3 years306 
Same Knowingly307 
Indiana Class D felony308 Imprisonment, 
6 months to 3 
years, and fine 
not more than 
$10,000309 
Same Knowingly, 
intentionally310 
Iowa Aggravated 
misdemeanor311 
Imprisonment, 
up to 2 years, 
and fine of 
$500 to 
$5,000312 
Same Strict 
Liability313 
Kentucky First violation is a 
Class A 
misdemeanor. Second 
or subsequent 
violation is a Class D 
felony.314 
Imprisonment, 
up to 1 year315 
Imprisonment, 
1 to 5 years316 
Strict 
Liability317 
 
 302. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329(1) (2006). 
 303. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-113(1) (2006). 
 304. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See § 18-
8329(1)(d). 
 305. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(d) (2006). 
 306. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (2006). 
 307. § 5/11-9.3(b-5). 
 308. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11 (West 2006). 
 309. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-7(a) (West 2006). 
 310. § 35-42-4-11. 
 311. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(3) (West 2006). 
 312. IOWA CODE ANN. § 903.1(2) (West 2006). 
 313. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(2). 
 314. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545(3) (West 2006). 
 315. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.090(1) (West 2006). 
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State Felony/Misdemeanor Punishment - 
1st Violation 
Punishment -
2nd or 
Subsequent 
Violations 
Mental 
Element 
Louisiana318 Misdemeanor Imprisonment, 
up to 6 
months, fine 
not to exceed 
$1,000, or 
both 
Same Strict 
Liability319 
Michigan320 First violation is a 
misdemeanor. Second 
or subsequent 
violation is a felony. 
Imprisonment 
up to 1 year, 
$1,000 fine, 
or both 
Imprisonment 
up to 2 years, 
$2,000 fine, 
or both 
Strict 
Liability321 
Mississippi322 Felony Imprisonment 
up to 5 years, 
fine up to 
$5,000, or 
both 
Same Strict 
Liability323 
Missouri First violation is a 
class D felony. 
Second or subsequent 
violation is a class B 
felony.324 
Imprisonment, 
up to 4 
years325 
Imprisonment, 
5 to 15 
years326 
Strict 
Liability327 
 
 316. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.060(2)(d) (West 2006). 
 317. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See KY. § 
17.545(1). 
 318. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(E) (2006). 
 319. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See id. § 
14:91.1(A)(2). 
 320. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.735(2)(a), (b) (2006). 
 321. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 28.735(1) (2006). 
 322. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-33(2) (2006). 
 323. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 35-33-25(4)(a) (2006) 
 324. MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147(4) (West 2006). 
 325. MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.011(1) (West 2006). 
 326. Id. 
 327. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See MO. 
CODE. ANN. § 566.147(1). 
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State Felony/Misdemeanor Punishment - 
1st Violation 
Punishment -
2nd or 
Subsequent 
Violations 
Mental 
Element 
Ohio328 A person who violates 
the prohibition is 
subject to an action 
for injunctive relief 
Injunction Injunction Strict 
Liability329 
Oklahoma330 Misdemeanor Fine not to 
exceed $3,000 
One year in 
county jail in 
addition to the 
fine 
Willfully, 
intentionally 
South 
Dakota 
First violation is a 
class 6 felony; 
subsequent violations 
are class 5 felonies331 
Imprisonment 
for 2 years, or 
fine of 
$4,000, or 
both332 
Imprisonment 
for 5 years. 
Optional fine 
of $10,000.333 
Strict 
Liability334 
Tennessee Class E felony335 Imprisonment, 
1 to 6 years336 
Same Knowingly337 
Virginia Class 6 felony338 Imprisonment, 
1 to 5 years; 
or, jail up to 
12 months 
and fine up to 
$2,500339 
Same Knowingly340 
 
 328. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(B) (West 2006). 
 329. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See id. § 
2950.031(A). 
 330. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (West 2006). 
 331. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-23 (2006). 
 332. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1(9) (2006). 
 333. § 22-6-1(8). 
 334. The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. See § 22-
24B-23. 
 335. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(e) (2006). 
 336. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-112 (2006). 
 337. § 40-39-211(a). 
 338. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.3(A) (2006). 
 339. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(f) (2006). 
 340. § 18.2-370.3(A). 
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TABLE 3 – SEX OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS 
 
State Employment 
prohibition 
applies to: 
Where is the 
offender 
prohibited from 
working? 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Alabama Persons convicted 
of a “criminal sex 
offense”341 
Within 2,000 feet 
of any school or 
child care 
facility342 
Life343 No 
Alabama Persons convicted 
of a criminal sex 
offense involving 
a child344 
Within 500 feet of 
any school, child 
care facility, park, 
athletic field or 
facility, or other 
business or facility 
having a principal 
purpose of caring 
for, educating, or 
entertaining 
minors345 
Life346 No 
Florida Sexual 
predators347 
At any business, 
school, day care 
center, park, 
playground, or 
other place where 
children regularly 
congregate348 
30 years to 
life349 
Yes350 
 
 341. ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(a), 15-20-21(1) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 342. § 15-20-26(a). 
 343. ALA. CODE § 15-20-33(a) (Westlaw through 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
 344. §§ 15-20-26(g), 15-20-21(1). 
 345. §§ 15-20-26(g). 
 346. § 15-20-33(a). 
 347. FLA. STAT. § 775.21(10)(b) (2006). 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. § 775.21(6)(l). 
 350. Id. A sexual predator may petition a court for removal of the sexual predator designation 
30 years after release.  Id. 
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State Employment 
prohibition 
applies to: 
Where is the 
offender 
prohibited from 
working? 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Georgia Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender351 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any child care 
facility, school, or 
church352 
10 years to 
life353 
 
Yes354 
Georgia Sexually 
dangerous 
predators355 
Within 1,000 feet 
of an area where 
minors 
congregate356 
Life357 
 
No 
Idaho Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender358 
At a day care 
center, group day 
care facility, or 
family day care 
home359 
10 years to 
life360 
Yes361 
Indiana Sexually violent 
predators362 
On school 
property, at youth 
program centers, 
or public parks363 
10 years to 
life364 
Yes365 
 
 351. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b)(1) (2006). 
 352. Id. 
 353. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(g) (2006). 
 354. Id. Effective July 1, 2006, sexual offenders may petition a court for release from 
registration requirements after 10 years.  Id.  If successful, the offender will no longer be subject to 
the employment restriction.  Id. 
 355. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b)(2). 
 356. Id. “Area where minors congregate” includes: public and private parks and recreation 
facilities, playgrounds, skating rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, school bus stops, and 
public/community swimming pools. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(3). 
 357. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-14 (2006) (containing no provisions for reconsideration of the 
“sexually dangerous predator” designation after the initial determination is final). 
 358. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8327(1) (2006). 
 359. Id. 
 360. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(1) (2006). 
 361. After 10 years, a sex offender may 1) if not required to register for life, petition a court for 
release from registration requirements, and 2) petition a court for relief from the employment 
prohibition. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8310(1), 18-8328. If successful with either petition, the 
offender will no longer be subject to the employment restriction. Id. 
 362. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-10(b) (West 2006) (effective July 1, 2006). 
 363. Id. 
 364. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.5(g) (West 2006). 
 365. Id. A sexually violent predator may petition a court to have the SVP status removed 10 
years after the initial classification.  Id. 
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State Employment 
prohibition 
applies to: 
Where is the 
offender 
prohibited from 
working? 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Michigan Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender366 
Within 1,000 feet 
of school 
property367 
10 years to 
life368 
Yes369 
Michigan Persons convicted 
of a “listed [sex] 
offense”370 
By a school or 
allowed to work 
under contract in a 
school371 
N/A N/A 
Oklahoma Registered sex 
offenders372 
To work with or 
provide services to 
children or work 
on school 
premises373 
10 years to 
life374 
Yes375 
Tennessee Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender whose 
victim was a 
minor376 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any school, day 
care/child care 
facility, public 
park, playground, 
recreation center, 
or athletic field377 
10 years to 
life378 
Yes379 
 
 366. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.734(1)(a) (2006). 
 367. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.734(1)(a), 28.733(f) (2006). 
 368. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.725(6), (7) (2006). 
 369. Id.  Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from 
registration requirements, and consequently the employment restriction, after 10 to 25 years.  Id. 
 370. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1230a(10) (2006). 
 371. Id. Interestingly, the statute gives discretion to the school board to approve the hiring of a 
non-sex felon, but not a sex offender. Id. 
 372. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 589(A) (West 2006). 
 373. Id. 
 374. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 583(C), 584(J) (West 2006). 
 375. Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from 
registration requirements, and consequently the employment restriction, after 10 years. Id. 
 376. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(a) (2006). 
 377. Id. 
 378. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(a), (f)(1) (2006). 
 379. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(c) (2006).  Sex offenders who are not required to register 
for life may petition the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation for release from registration 
requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be subject to the employment 
restriction.  Id. 
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State Employment 
prohibition 
applies to: 
Where is the 
offender 
prohibited from 
working? 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Virginia Adults convicted 
of certain sex 
offenses where 
the offender is 
more than 3 years 
older than the 
victim380 
On public or 
private elementary 
or secondary 
school or child 
day care center 
property381 
Life382 No 
 
 
 
 
 380. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.4(A) (2006). 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. The offender “shall be forever prohibited from working” in the prohibited area.  Id. 
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Appendix 1: 
http://www.webstercity.com/departments/police_dept/692a.2a_map.asp 
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